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INCENTIVE CONDITIONS:  THE VALIDITY OF 
INNOVATIVE FINANCIAL PARENTING BY 
PASSING ALONG WEALTH AND VALUES 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
An incentive condition is a provision in a will or trust that is meant 
to induce or motivate a beneficiary to act in order to receive money from 
a testator.1  States need to adopt statutes that allow incentive conditions 
within certain limitations to avoid potential conflict, confusion, and 
litigation.2  Further, in order to address the public policy concerns 
regarding incentive trusts, states should codify specific limitations to 
drafting incentive conditions.3 
Baby-boomers will give an estimated twenty-five trillion dollars 
through inheritances during the next fifty years.4  Parents and 
grandparents are increasingly concerned about the negative 
consequences that inherited wealth may have on their heirs.5  While 
wealth transmissions of yesterday tended to center on major items of 
patrimony, today’s wealth transmissions center on the investment in 
values and skills.6  Thus, while planning how to dispense their wealth, 
many people are planning how to pass down their work ethic, religion, 
educational goals, and philanthropic values by creating wills and trusts 
containing incentive conditions.7   
In order to determine the validity of a given incentive condition, the 
Restatement (Third) of Trusts proposes three guidelines.8  According to the 
Restatement, although an individual is free to give or withhold property 
from another during his lifetime, it does not follow that the individual 
can attach whatever terms or conditions he chooses to attach by trust.9  
                                                 
1 See infra Part II.C.  For a definition of “testator,” see note 29. 
2 See infra Part III. 
3 See infra Parts III–IV. 
4 Mary Hickok, Family Incentive Trusts Pass Along Values Too:  Concerns About Spoiling 
Heirs Have Boosted the Popularity of Such Plans, 26 NAT’L L.J. 16, 16 (2004).  Attorneys and 
other trust professionals will be the key to the success of the transfer process.  Id.; see also 
Ellen E. Whiting, Controlling Behavior by Controlling the Inheritance:  Considerations in Drafting 
Incentive Provisions, 15 PROB. & PROP. 6 (Sept./Oct. 2001). 
5 Whiting, supra note 4.  Some of the concerns include wasting the inherited, easily 
attained money; not learning to be a productive, hard working citizen; or practicing a 
particular religion.  Id. 
6 John H. Langbein, The Twentieth-Century Revolution in Family Wealth Transmission, 86 
MICH. L. REV. 722, 723 (1988); see infra note 54 and accompanying text. 
7 Hickok, supra note 4, at 16. 
8 See infra Part II.D. 
9 See infra Part II. 
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Though the Restatement sets forth some guidelines, there still exists a 
gray area as to the validity of a designed condition in a trust.10  In 
addition, many states lack codified language and vary in treatment 
concerning incentive conditions, which will inevitably lead to conflict, 
confusion, and unnecessary litigation.11   
To avoid litigation that may arise in the future when incentive trusts 
are interpreted, states must adopt statutes dealing with the requirements 
and validity of an incentive condition.12  In order to address concerns 
regarding a beneficiary’s choice and dead-hand control while still 
allowing individuals to freely distribute their wealth, states should adopt 
statutes that provide specific limitations to drafting incentive 
conditions.13   
This Note first sets forth the background of estate planning and 
incentive conditions, discussing case law and the Restatement’s 
treatment of incentive conditions.14  Next, this Note analyzes why states 
should allow incentive conditions within certain limitations and why the 
current case law, statutes, and Restatements do not sufficiently address 
incentive conditions.15  Finally, this Note sets forth a suggested statute 
that a state should adopt to consistently address the treatment of 
incentive conditions.16 
II.  BACKGROUND 
Through incentive trusts, individuals attach contingencies on 
transfers of their wealth based on work ethic, religion, and education 
because many individuals planning how to distribute their wealth are 
concerned with passing along their values and morals.17  Further, 
                                                 
10 See infra Part II. 
11 See infra Part II. 
12 See infra Part II. 
13 See infra Part III.  Despite the view of a state, it is imperative that states adopt some 
statutory provision to deal with incentive conditions to avoid tying up its courts with 
litigation.  Id.  For a definition of dead-hand control, see infra note 78. 
14 See infra Part II. 
15 See infra Parts III.A–B. 
16 See infra Part IV. 
17 Hickock, supra note 4.  For example, in Shapira v. Union National Bank, 315 N.E.2d 825 
(Ohio App. 1974), a father was concerned about supporting the Jewish religion and 
conditioned his son’s inheritance on his marriage to a Jewish woman.  Id. at 826; see infra 
notes 122–24 and accompanying text.  For example, parents are concerned that their 
children will not learn to appreciate working hard, will not get an education, and will rely 
on inherited wealth, making the children unproductive citizens.  Hickok, supra note 4, at 
16. 
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individuals now describe behavioral incentive conditions using a great 
deal of creative freedom.18  Some individuals act as if the sky is the limit 
with respect to the freedom they use in drafting incentive conditions.19  
However, in some cases, courts have ruled that particular incentive 
conditions contained in a will or trust are invalid, causing a transfer of 
wealth in a way not desired by the individual who made the will or 
trust.20  First, Part II.A discusses the general background of estate 
planning, and Part II.B discusses individual state statutes that are 
pertinent to estate planning.21  Next, Part II.C discusses incentive 
conditions in general.22  Part II.D describes the Restatement’s treatment 
of incentive conditions.23  Finally, Part II.E discusses the varying 
methods utilized in treating specific types of incentive conditions, 
including in terrorem clauses, marriage and family relationships, 
religion, the language of the condition, and state regulation of incentive 
conditions.24 
A. General Background of Estate Planning  
The goal of an estate plan is to ensure that one’s property passes to 
those whom he wishes to receive it, in the manner in which he wishes 
them to receive it, and at a minimum cost.25  The cost of an estate plan is 
measured in terms of administration expenses, court costs, attorneys’ 
fees, and taxes.26  In order to accomplish his specific goals, a property 
                                                 
18 See infra note 62 and accompanying text. 
19 See infra note 62 and accompanying text. 
20 See infra Part II.E. 
21 See infra Parts II.A–B. 
22 See infra Part II.C. 
23 See infra Part II.D. 
24 See infra Part II.E. 
25 ALINE F. ANDERSON & DIANE HUBBARD KENNEDY, ANDERSON’S WILLS, TRUSTS AND 
ESTATE PLANNING § 1:1 (2004).  Anderson and Kennedy state: 
The goal of estate planning is to transfer property upon death, taking 
into account the owner’s desires and possible tax administrative costs.  
The planner must consider the client’s assets, their fair market value, 
the manner in which the assets are titled, the intended beneficiaries 
and federal and state tax ramifications. 
Id.  For a history of estate planning administration, see Sarajane Love, Estate Creditors, the 
Constitution, and the Uniform Probate Code, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 411, 415–25 (1996). 
26 ANDERSON & KENNEDY, supra note 25, § 1:1.  Unless legislation changes the Internal 
Revenue Code, estate tax is phasing out entirely and will not exist for one year  as of the 
year 2010.  26 U.S.C. § 2001 (2004). 
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owner has options to transfer what he owns by means of a will, trust, or 
a state’s intestate laws.27   
A will is a purely testamentary legal tool that is effective only after 
the death of its maker.28  The testator specifies certain individuals as 
beneficiaries, defines what each beneficiary will receive, and appoints an 
executor to handle the work.29  The will controls disposition of property 
held in the testator’s name alone.30  The property becomes payable to the 
testator’s probate estate after his death.31  A properly drafted will can 
                                                 
27 ANDERSON & KENNEDY, supra note 25, § 1:1.  When a property owner does not have a 
will at the time of his death, intestacy is the result and statutes establish an estate plan.  Id. 
§ 1:11.  Also, individuals can transfer wealth by gift, which is a transfer of property during 
the lifetime of the transferor for less than full and adequate consideration.  26 U.S.C. 
§ 2053(c)(1)(A) (2004). When an individual dies and probate is necessary, a personal 
representative must oversee the winding up of the decedent’s estate.  JESSE DUKEMINIER & 
STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 35 (6th ed. 2000).  The personal 
representative examines and collects the assets of the decedent, manages the assets during 
administration, receives and pays the claims of creditors, and distributes the remaining 
assets to those entitled.  Id. at 35, 36.  Further, personal representatives, if not named by the 
will, are appointed by the probate court and are under the control of and accountable to the 
probate court.  Id. at 36; see infra note 31. 
28 See ANDERSON & KENNEDY, supra note 25, § 2:1; Paul Premack, Difference Between Trust 
& Will (Mar. 4, 2003), available at http://www.premack.com/columns/2003/2003-03-
04.htm. 
29 Premack, supra note 28. Testator is defined as, “[a] person who has made a will; esp., a 
person who dies leaving a will.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1514 (8th ed. 2004).  While a 
testator is a man who makes a will, a testatrix is a woman who makes a will.  GERRY W. 
BEYER, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 5 (2d ed. 2002).  An executor is the person the testator 
names to carry out the provisions of his will.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 610 (8th ed. 2004).  
Although a will can establish a trust in order to impose restrictions on certain heirs, that 
trust operates only after the will has been probated.  Premack, supra note 28.  The executor 
receives legal credentials to act for the decedent’s estate upon the death of the maker of the 
will.  MAYER BROWN ROWE & MAW, INTRODUCTION TO ESTATE PLANNING 1 (2003).  The 
executor is the personal representative that is named in a will of a decedent who dies 
testate.  DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 27, at 36.  One of the advantages of having a 
will as opposed to dying intestate is that the testator can name the executor of his estate.  Id.  
If a person dies intestate or fails to name an executor who can administer the estate, the 
administor is selected from a statutory list of individuals in the following order:  surviving 
spouse, children, parents, siblings, creditors.  Id. 
30 MAYER BROWN ROWE & MAW, supra note 29, at 1.  A settlor is “a person who furnishes, 
either directly or indirectly, the consideration or corpus for a trust.”  Id.  Disposition of 
property refers to the distribution of the testator’s property to those who are entitled to the 
property.  DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 27, at 36. 
31 BEYER, supra note 29, at 3.  Probate is the legal process through which a will is 
activated.  Premack, supra note 28.  Further, “[t]here are three major functions of probate, 
which is the administration of the decedent’s estate:  (1) to provide evidence of transfer of 
title, (2) to protect creditors by requiring payment of debts, and (3) to distribute the 
decedent’s property according to his or her intent.”  Melissa B. Vegter, Comment, The 
“ART” of Inheritance:  A Proposal for Legislation Requiring Proof of Parental Intent Before 
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make the probate process more efficient by eliminating court supervision 
of the executor, who completes the decedent’s remaining business and 
distributes the remaining assets.32  If an individual has no will, the 
intestacy laws of the state in which he is a legal resident generally control 
the disposition of his property.33   
A trust, on the other hand, is a fiduciary relationship concerning 
property management arrangements in which one person, the trustee, 
manages assets for the benefit of another person, the beneficiary.34  In 
                                                                                                             
Posthumously Conceived Children Can Inherit from a Deceased Parent’s Estate, 38 VAL. U. L. REV. 
267, 315 n.32 (2003) (referring to DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 27, at 39). 
32 Premack, supra note 28.  Sometimes the will’s maker desires court supervision or fails 
to waive it.  Id.  If so, probate can become a slow, detailed process.  Id.  Further, the 
administrative costs of probate include fees from probate court, an attorney, personal 
representatives, appraisers, and guardian ad litems.  DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 
27, at 44. 
33 ANDERSON & KENNEDY, supra note 25, § 1:11.  A state’s intestacy laws distribute 
property of a decedent who has died without a will according to state statutes that were 
written by the legislature.  DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 27, at 72.  In drafting a 
state’s intestacy laws, the legislature made its best guess as to how the decedent would 
have distributed his money if he had made a will.  Id.  One-third of the states follow the 
model Uniform Probate Code’s intestate section.  Id.  Regarding an intestate estate, the 
Uniform Probate Code states: 
(a) Any part of a decedent’s estate not effectively disposed of by will 
passes by intestate succession to the decedent’s heirs as prescribed in 
this Code, except as modified by the decedent’s will.  (b) A decedent 
by will may expressly exclude or limit the right of an individual or 
class to succeed to property of the decedent passing by intestate 
succession. If that individual or a member of that class survives the 
decedent, the share of the decedent’s intestate estate to which that 
individual or class would have succeeded passes as if that individual 
or each member of that class had disclaimed his [or her] intestate 
share. 
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-101 (amended 1993).  Other states, such as Indiana, have adopted 
their own code.  IND. CODE § 29-1-2-1 (2004).  For example, the Indiana Code lists several 
circumstances in which to give out property of a person who has died intestate.  Id.  The 
state code provides that property belonging to a person dying intestate shall pass to the 
surviving spouse if there is no surviving issue or parent of the deceased.  Id. § 29-1-2-
1(b)(3).  If the person is survived by at least one child or the issue of at least one deceased 
child, the surviving spouse gets one-half of the property.  Id. § 29-1-2-1(b)(1).  The surviving 
spouse shall receive three-fourths of the net estate when there are no surviving children but 
one or both of the decedent’s parents are surviving.  Id. § 29-1-2-1(b)(2).  After giving the 
surviving spouse his share, the remaining property is distributed using the following 
hierarchy list:  the decedent’s children, the surviving parents if there is a surviving spouse 
and no surviving children, the surviving parents and siblings including children of 
deceased siblings, the nephews and nieces, and the grandparents.  Id. § 29-1-2-1(d).  If 
money is left over after descending through the list, then the money goes to the state.  Id. 
§ 29-1-2-1(d)(8). 
34 GEORGE G. BOGERT & GEORGE T. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 1 (2d ed. 
1984 & Supp. 2004).  The person for whom a trust is established is called the “beneficiary.”  
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addition, a property owner may transfer property to a trust during his 
lifetime, and the terms of the trust document control the disposition of 
the property during the life and after the death of the settlor.35 
                                                                                                             
Id.  Where the beneficiary is an individual, the trust is a private trust.  Id.  An artificial legal 
entity, such as a corporation, may also serve as a beneficiary to a trust.  Id.  The beneficiary 
of a charitable trust is the public.  Id.  “[A] trust is a fiduciary relationship in which one 
person is the holder of the title to property subject to an equitable obligation to keep or use 
the property for the benefit of another.”  Jewish Cmty. Ass’n v. Cmty. Bank, 6 P.3d 1264, 
1266 (Wyo. 2000) (quoting Scotti’s Drive In Restaurants, Inc. v. Mile High Oil-Dart In Corp., 
526 P.2d 1193, 1196 (Wyo. 1974)).  A trustee is a person who holds title to property in a trust 
and has the duty to manage the property according to the instructions of the settlor and 
applicable trust law.  BEYER, supra note 29, at 5. 
35 MAYER BROWN ROWE & MAW, supra note 29, at 2.  The person who intentionally 
causes the trust to come into existence is called the “settlor.”  BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 
34, § 1.  This individual who creates the trust is often called the trustor, grantor, foundor, 
donor, or creator of the trust.  Id.  Where the trust is created by will, the individual who 
created the trust is called the testator.  Id.  Trusts are revocable or irrevocable, tax-
motivated or tax-neutral, and testamentary or inter-vivos.  Premack, supra note 28.  A 
“living trust” is a special trust subcategory that is revocable, tax-neutral, and operates both 
during and after the lifetime of the creator of the trust.  Id.  At its inception, a living trust’s 
assets are usually managed by its creator unless he becomes disabled.  Id.  If the creator 
becomes disabled, an alternate trustee takes over and uses the trust assets to pay bills, buy 
food, and provide shelter and care for the trust creator.  Id.  When the trust creator dies, the 
alternate trustee enacts provisions that identify alternate beneficiaries, distributing assets to 
specific individuals.  Id.  The property owner is called the testator if male and the testatrix if 
female.  MAYER BROWN ROWE & MAW, supra note 29, at 2.  The trust property is the 
property interest, real or personal, tangible or intangible, which the trustee holds, subject to 
the rights of the beneficiary.  BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 34, § 1.  In order to create a valid 
private trust, the trust instrument must contain:  (1) an expression of intent to hold 
property for the benefit of a person other than the settlor, (2) the name of at least one 
beneficiary, and (3) an interest in property that is in existence or is ascertainable and held 
for the benefit of the beneficiary.  Id.  Trust instrument refers to the document, whether a 
deed, agreement, or will, in which the settlor or testator expresses an intent to have a trust 
and provides the details of the trust, the trust terms.  Id.  A trust instrument is not needed 
when a trust is created without a writing.  Id.  When the trust is created without an 
instrument, the terms of the trust are determined by evidence of the settlor’s intent.  Id.  A 
trust that does not involve any written instrument is called an implied trust, while a trust 
that goes through the requisite formalities is called an express trust.  Id. § 8.  A trust may be 
created by: 
(a) a transfer by the will of a property owner to another person as 
trustee for one or more persons; or (b) a transfer inter vivos by a 
property owner to another person as trustee for one or more persons; 
or (c) a declaration by an owner of property that he or she holds that 
property as trustee for one or more persons; or (d) an exercise of a 
power of appointment by appointing property to a person as trustee 
for one or more persons who are objects of the power; or (e) a promise 
or beneficiary designation that creates enforceable rights in a person 
who immediately or later holds those rights as trustee, or who 
pursuant to those rights later receives property as trustee, for one or 
more persons. 
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Typically, after-death distributions under a trust are implemented 
privately without the need for probate.36  A trust avoids probate because 
the trust creator, while still living, transfers assets into the name of the 
trustee or name of the trust.37  If any assets were not transferred to the 
trust, those assets may still pass according to the stipulations described 
in the will or by way of intestacy.38  Thus, while wills are less expensive 
initially, they usually require probate, which renders them more 
expensive and more time consuming to execute.39  Trusts, on the other 
hand, are initially more expensive, but because they usually avoid the 
probate process, they are ultimately less expensive and less time 
consuming.40  Just as trusts are created to manage a testator’s property, 
states have also developed statutes to manage the intricacies of trusts. 
                                                                                                             
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 10 (2003).  In addition, trusts are classified with respect 
to their method of creation and with respect to the point of view of the purpose or objective 
of the trust.  BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 34, § 1.  Regarding classifications based on the 
method of creation, a settlor creates a living trust when the settlor is a living settlor.  Id.  
When the source of the trust is the creator’s will, a testamentary trust is created.  Id.  Private 
trusts exist for the benefit of one or more individuals, while charitable or public trusts exist 
for the advantage of society or a large segment of society.  Id.  Regarding instances when 
trusts are classified from the point of view of its objective, family trusts are used when the 
primary purpose is to distribute property among relatives.  Id. at 13.  Business or 
commercial objectives, when in a trust, are called business trusts.  Id.  An investment trust 
is a trust used to furnish and administer funds for investments.  Id. 
36 Premack, supra note 28. 
37 Id.  For example, any real estate owned by the trust creator should have been deeded 
to the trustee at about the same time the trust was created.  Id.  The concept of transferring 
assets is called “funding” the trust and is what eventually avoids probate.  Id.  Assets that 
were transferred to the trustee are under the trustee’s legal control.  Id.  The death of the 
trust creator does not change that control; rather, it is a signal to the trustee to enact the 
provisions identifying alternate beneficiaries.  Id.; see supra note 35. 
38 Premack, supra note 28.  Thus, a living trust is not an absolute guarantee that there 
will not also be a probate.  Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Fiduciary Trust Co. Int’l, Revocable Trusts Advantages, Disadvantages and Myths (2004), 
available at http://www.ftci.com/jsp/content.jsp?url=/commentary/FTI_Trust_Topics 
RevocableTrusts.  How much of a benefit it may be varies from one place to the next.  Id.  
For example, avoiding probate may be a significant benefit for a person who owns real 
estate in more than one state because he can avoid multiple probate proceedings.  Id.  
Because each jurisdiction’s probate process is different, it is necessary to consult local 
counsel to determine which, if any, disadvantages of probate apply.  Premack, supra note 
28.  Trusts and wills are two different roads that lead to the same destination.  Id.  Which 
road is selected depends on individual needs and preferences.  Id.  Regarding intestacy, 
some of the disadvantages to intestacy are that intended beneficiaries may get nothing and 
that beneficiaries take shares outright, regardless of whether the beneficiary can handle the 
property.  ANDERSON & KENNEDY, supra note 25,  § 1:12. 
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B. State Regulation of Trusts 
At the end of the eighteenth century, when trusts came into common 
use in America, litigated disputes were common despite the poverty and 
newness of America.41  However, since the beginning of the nineteenth 
century, trust law has greatly developed in order to adapt to changing 
economic and social conditions.42  Although many countries, such as 
England, have codified laws regarding trusts to meet changing 
conditions with regard to business and property law, in the United 
States, only a handful of states have codified trust principles.43  Further, 
states possess the authority to grant the right to receive property.44  Each 
state has the power to choose how to regulate the transfer of property 
within its boundaries.45 
Only some states have trust codes or statutes containing detailed 
rules that govern the creation and administration of trusts.46  Most states’ 
                                                 
41 BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 34, § 1.  The American colonies adopted the English 
system of trusts.  Id.  For a list of twenty-eight early cases where a trust was discussed or 
construed in America in the late eighteenth century, see id. 
42 Id.  To read articles that trace the developments made in trust law, see Developments in 
the Law of Trusts, 48 HARV. L. REV. 1162 (1935). 
43 BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 34, § 1.  For example, England has codified a 
considerable amount of trust law since 1850, including the Judicial Trustee Act, the Public 
Trustee Act, the Perpetuities and Accumulations Act of 1964, and the Variation of Trusts 
Act.  Id.  Scotland, Canada, and Australia have also developed legislation regarding trust 
law that is similar to England.  Id.; see also infra note 160. 
44 Scholey v. Rew, 90 U.S. 331, 335 (1874); Hall v. Vallandingham, 540 A.2d 1162, 1164 
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988) (“The right to receive property by devise or descent is not a 
natural right but a privilege granted by the State.”); Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Bouse, 29 
A.2d 906, 910 (Md. 1943). 
45 Mager v. Grima 49 U.S. 490 (1850); Vallandingham, 540 A.2d at 1164.  The court stated: 
Every State possesses the power to regulate the manner or term by 
which property within its dominion may be transmitted by will or 
inheritance and to prescribe who shall or shall not be capable of 
receiving that property. A State may deny the privilege altogether or 
may impose whatever restrictions or conditions upon the grant it 
deems appropriate. 
Vallandingham, 540 A.2d at 1164. 
46 BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 34, § 1.  Leading the way in state codification of trust 
laws, New York and California were the first states that codified many trust principles.  Id. 
§ 1, at 29.  In addition, some other states, such as Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, 
Oklahoma, and Pennsylvania, have trust codes or statutes containing detailed rules that 
govern the creation and administration of trusts.  Id.  Texas has also joined the group of 
states that have provisions that are related to trust laws in its Trust Act, which was 
consolidated into its Property Code in 1984.  Id.  More recently, Washington, Montana, 
Michigan, Arkansas, Missouri, and Iowa have adopted provisions that deal with trust law.  
Id.  The state of New York’s Estates, Powers, and Trusts Law, which took effect in 1967, 
codified in one chapter all statutes covering the substantive law of estates and trusts, 
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statutes regarding trust laws are incomplete and govern only limited 
aspects of trusts.47  Although many provisions of Article VII of the 
Uniform Probate Code have been adopted by a number of states in some 
form, the concept of trust regulation is a novel concept.48  Specifically, in 
states where trusts are not subject to  statutory regulation or direct 
judicial supervision, concern may exist that the registration and 
permissive court proceedings provided in Article VII will lead to 
additional litigation and tying up of the courts.49  Individuals 
increasingly utilize the freedom states allow in drafting trusts by adding 
incentive conditions to manipulate the behavior of their beneficiaries, 
which typically include family members.50 
C. Incentive Conditions 
In today’s society, many wealthy individuals strategize about 
distributing their possessions.51  Often, people are more concerned with 
                                                                                                             
including powers and regulations of fiduciaries’ activities.  Id.  In 1987, California enacted 
Cal.Stats.1986, c. 820, a Trust Law, as part of the California Probate Code.  Id.  Also, 
Montana adopted a new trust code in 1989 that was patterned after the California Probate 
Code.  Id. 
47 Id. § 1, at 34.  These undeveloped statutes merely guide the creation of trusts and steer 
the trustee in carrying out his administration duties.  Id. § 1, at 35.  Many times, the 
provision applies only where the settlor has not otherwise provided in a trust himself.  Id.  
One example includes legislation establishing authorized trust investments, which grants 
broad powers to trustees and sets forth rules as to trust accountings and trustee 
compensation.  Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Id.  Specifically, Indiana, a state with more developed trust laws, has statutes 
concerning certain types of provisions that are void because the provisions are against 
public policy.  Id.  According to Indiana law regarding restraint of marriage, “[a] devise to a 
spouse with a condition in restraint of marriage shall stand, but the condition shall be 
void.”  IND. CODE § 29-1-6-3 (2004). 
50 See infra Part II.C. 
51 James Edward Harris, Level Five Philanthropy:  Designing a Plan for Strategic, Effective, 
Efficient Giving, 26 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 19, 20 (1999) (quoting Doing Well By Doing 
Good, Improving Client Service Increases Philanthropic Capital:  The Legal and Financial Advisors 
Role, 2000 THE PHILANTHROPIC INITIATIVE, INC. 9).  Most of those interested in the incentive 
trusts have also made their fortunes in recent years and have a negative bias against 
inherited wealth.  Monica Langley & Ricardo Gandara, You Worked to Earn Your Millions, 
but Will Your Kids be Spoiled Trust, AUSTIN AM.—STATESMAN, Jan. 8, 2000, at D1.  The 
concept is proving enormously popular as a form of “financial parenting,” as well as a 
good way to avoid estate taxes.  Id.  Atlanta Braves star pitcher, Tom Glavine, who has an 
annual salary of eight million dollars, has created a family incentive trust for his children.  
Monica Langley, Trust Me Baby:  The House, the Money, It’ll All Be Yours; There’s Just One 
Thing,  WALL ST. J., Nov. 17, 1999, at A1.  Glavine’s trust provides that the trust will match 
the income the children earn up to $100,000.  Id.  Glavine also intends to encourage his 
family, through trust money, to play sports, set up a veterinary practice (or other business), 
stay at home with their kids, and do well in school.  Id. 
Steiner: Incentinve Conditions:  The Validity of Innovative Financial Pare
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2006
906 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40 
keeping their heirs in line rather than avoiding probate and minimizing 
their taxes.52  An emerging central goal of estate planning is to protect 
and preserve the family’s values, as opposed to the goal of protecting 
and preserving the family’s assets.53  Wealth transmission formerly 
centered on birthright, but now wealth transmission centers on the 
investment of skills or values.54  Therefore, when a property owner is 
primarily concerned with preserving values, he will create an incentive 
condition regarding his expectations of his offspring’s conduct, his belief 
about marriage or divorce, or his desire for charitable behavior.55   
                                                 
52 Whiting, supra note 4, at 6.  The most pressing issues among wealthy people today are 
protecting the family wealth and encouraging productivity.  Id.  The top 0.5% of wealthy 
Americans were concerned that their heirs would be materialistic or naïve about money, 
according to a recent survey by U.S. Trust.  Id.  Warren Buffett was quoted saying that “the 
perfect inheritance is enough money so that they feel they can do anything, but not so 
much that they could do nothing.”  Id.  In addition, absent a legislative change of the 
Internal Revenue Code, the estate tax exemption will disappear in 2010.  26 U.S.C.A. § 2001. 
53 John. J. Scroggin, Restraining an Inheritance Can Accomplish a Client’s Objectives, 30 EST. 
PLAN. 124, 124 (2003).  Property owners are sometimes unwilling to give large inheritances 
to beneficiaries because they fear that they have failed to teach their children financial 
responsibility.  Id. 
54 John H. Langbein, The Twentieth-Century Revolution in Family Wealth Transmission, 86 
MICH. L. REV. 722, 723 (1988).  Items of patrimony include the family farm or firm and the 
ability to rescue a beneficiary from the harsh fate of being a mere laborer.  Id.  As a 
consequence of the new trend to transfer money to invest in skills, transfers occur during 
the life of the beneficiaries rather than at the death of the benefactor.  Id.  Further, children 
get financial help from their parents today during their lifetimes for expenses such as 
education, but they do not depend on any inheritance.  Id.  People are also living longer 
and their parents do not pass away until they are at least middle aged so children do not 
depend on an inheritance for support.  Id. 
55 Scroggin, supra note 53, at 124.  In each of the circumstances,  some form of restrained 
inheritance exists.  Id.  In particular, one strategy aimed to pass along values in addition to 
wealth is to initiate incentive conditions in a trust.  Hickok, supra note 4, at 17.  Any 
properly drafted trust, i.e., life insurance trust, credit shelter trust, dynasty or generation 
skipping trust, revocable trust, or charitable trust, is acceptable to contain an incentive 
condition.  Whiting, supra note 4, at 6.  In addition, according to Harris: 
A growing body of literature encourages people to identify their basic 
values and to write a personal mission statement:  a clear, concise 
declaration of their purpose in life and what they hope to accomplish 
with it.  Two best sellers that advocate this are The Seven Habits of 
Highly Effective People, by Stephen Covey, and What Color is Your 
Parachute, by Richard Bolles.  Covey develops a personal planning 
system that applies values and mission to the various roles in life and 
develops goals for each role.  Bolles combines those ideas with the 
concept of discovering one’s unique skills and interests to land the job 
of one’s dreams. 
Harris, supra note 51, at 21–22.  When a property owner is primarily concerned with 
preserving his values, the plan initially concentrates on non-tax issues such as incentive 
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An incentive condition is a type of condition precedent or condition 
subsequent that allows an heir to inherit only if he has behaved in a 
desired way described in the trust.56  The ability to devise individually 
tailored conditions that are effective beyond one’s lifetime has made the 
trust a treasured device, making creatively devised incentive conditions 
a new trend of the millennium.57  Examples of encouraged behavior 
                                                                                                             
conditions.  Scroggin, supra note 53, at 124.  Providing examples of the possible non-tax 
incentives in a trust, Scroggin lists: 
[T]aking into account the offspring, marriage, personality, and 
character of each child.  Focusing on difficult family issues (e.g., the 
expectation of divorce).  Minimizing the sources of potential family 
conflicts (e.g., personal property dispositions).  Creating opportunities 
and incentives for heirs, without supporting an unearned lifestyle.  
Assisting the client’s desire to pass on productive values to future 
generations.  Encouraging charitable involvement.  Placing reasonable, 
flexible restraints on inherited wealth.  Building balance and flexibility 
into the plan to permit modifications in the future. 
Id. 
56 Hickok, supra note 4, at 17.  A condition is “[a] stipulation or prerequisite in a contract, 
will, or other instrument, constituting the essence of the instrument.”  BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 312 (8th ed. 2004).  Further, a condition precedent is defined as: 
An act or event, other than a lapse of time, that must exist or occur 
before a duty to perform something promised arises.  If the condition 
does not occur and is not excused, the promised performance need not 
be rendered.  The most common condition contemplated by this 
phrase is the immediate or unconditional duty of performance by a 
promisor. 
Id.  A condition subsequent is “[a] condition that, if it occurs, will bring something else to 
an end; an event the existence of which, by agreement of the parties, discharges a duty of 
performance that has arisen.”  Id.  For example, Microsoft millionaire, Greg Tracy has 
written in his children’s trust that the children must “demonstrate financial responsibility, 
gainful employment and lack of harmful dependencies.”  Langley, supra note 51, at D1.  If 
the child is getting an education or working, the trust can make liberal distributions.  Id.  
However, the distributions are cut off if the child is on drugs, abusing alcohol, or in a cult.  
Id.  In summary, incentive trusts are intended to motivate or discourage particular conduct 
by the beneficiary.  Financial Planning Ass’n, The Pros and Cons of Incentive Trusts (2001), 
available at http://www.bevbank.com/library/0101/.  For example, an incentive condition 
providing that a beneficiary receive money from a trust only if he does not harass another 
beneficiary discourages the particular behavior of harassing the other beneficiaries for 
money.  See infra notes 89–95 and accompanying text. 
57 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 cmt. i (2003).  The Restatement states: 
The private trust is tolerated, even treasured, in the common-law 
world for the flexibility it offers to property owners in planning and 
designing diverse beneficial interests and financial protections over 
time, individually tailored as the particular property owner deems best 
to the varied needs, abilities, and circumstances of particular family 
members and others whom the owner chooses to benefit. 
Id.  In order to pass along values, as well as money, creatively devising incentive conditions 
has become a new trend for the millennium.  Langley, supra note 51, at A1.  Langley’s 
article quotes Rodney Owens, an attorney whose clients are incorporating incentives and 
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depicted in an incentive condition include obtaining an education or 
post-graduate degree, showing a good work ethic, demonstrating 
stewardship, or engaging in  philanthropic behavior.58  Other goals 
include, but are not limited to, benevolence, missionary work, marriage, 
and saving for retirement.59  Many property owners wish to discourage 
other behavior, such as squandering, consumption, laziness, or any 
illegal activity.60  Not only are there many different values that property 
owners desire, there are also many different conditions property owners 
establish in order to accomplish their desires.61 
Upon examining the history of incentive conditions, it is apparent 
that wealthy parents have historically attached conditions to the passing 
of their fortunes.62  One of the oldest and most common conditions 
involved an age requirement, where a beneficiary received wealth only 
                                                                                                             
disincentives into their estate plans.  Id.  Many of his clients’ trusts deny payments if, for 
example, children do not set up a prenuptial agreement or if they fail a drug test.  Id.  The 
trusts also reward charitable work or participation in family foundations.  Id. 
58 Wells, Marble & Hurst PLLC, Incentive Trusts:  An Idea Whose Time has Come (and 
Gone?) (2004), available at http://www.wellsmar.com/CM/NewsandArticles/Newsand 
Articles42.asp.  Individuals use incentive conditions by distributing wealth based on a 
beneficiary earning a certain degree, maintaining a stated grade point average, or attending 
a particular school.  Clark Hill PLC, Use Incentive Trusts to Reinforce Values (2002), available 
at http://www.clarkhill.com/law_media/IEP2002-06.pdf#search=‘incentive%20trusts’.  
For example, a beneficiary may discover that he is entitled to one million dollars from his 
uncle if and only if he gets a bachelor’s degree.  Id. 
59 Wells, Marble & Hurst PLLC, supra note 58; Clark Hill PLC, supra note 58.  An 
incentive condition may encourage community involvement or volunteerism by stating 
that the trust will match any donations given by the beneficiary.  Clark Hill PLC, supra note 
58.  The trust may also distribute funds in the trust if the beneficiary pursues a low-income 
career, such as teaching, social work, or a religious career.  Id.  Provisions may also allow 
for the distribution of money to a beneficiary who takes an active role in the family’s 
philanthropic movement.  Id. 
60 Wells, Marble & Hurst PLLC, supra note 58; Clark Hill PLC, supra note 58.  
Commonly, individuals will design incentive conditions around the beneficiary’s choices 
regarding the beneficiary’s health.  Clark Hill PLC, supra note 58.  For instance, a condition 
may state that the beneficiary may not drink, smoke, or do drugs, and the trust may state 
that the beneficiary must maintain a certain weight.  Id. 
61 Wells, Marble & Hurst PLLC, supra note 58. 
62 Langley, supra note 51, at A1.  What is new in the incentive approach is the wide-
ranging and highly specific nature of the parental conditions.  Langley & Gandara, supra 
note 51, at D1.  Parents are often picking incentives that correlate to strikingly idiosyncratic 
concerns.  Id.  “The only limit is the imagination,” according to one attorney.  Id.  Parents 
are planning conditions that involve the chances of the beneficiary becoming legally 
incapacitated due to a physical or mental disability.  Wells, Marble & Hurst PLLC, supra 
note 58.  The beneficiary may be a spendthrift, chemically dependent, easily influenced, or 
consistently make bad choices regarding such things as marriage partners and financial 
matters.  Id. 
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when the beneficiary reached a named age in the trust or will.63  For 
example, in Webster v. Morris,64 the testator provided that an executor 
must keep the principal sum of the value of an estate given to the 
testator’s grandson in a trust until the grandson reached thirty years of 
age.65  The condition was set so that the child could mature and know 
how to handle financial matters in an appropriate way.66  The Supreme 
Court of Wisconsin allowed the condition and stated that everyone has a 
legal right to transfer his property as he sees fit.67  Another long-standing 
and popular example of a condition in a trust is where an inheritance is 
                                                 
63 Financial Planning Ass’n, supra note 56.  This type of trust is also called a delayed 
distribution.  Wells, Marble & Hurst PLLC, supra note 58.  According to Harris: 
The practice of creating a lasting expression of one’s most deeply held 
values is not new. Examples of the ancient custom of “ethical wills,” 
statements intended to pass along values and beliefs to succeeding 
generations, can be found among the Old Testament patriarchs.  First 
handed down in oral tradition and later reduced to writing, ethical 
wills at one point became as common as attachments to legal wills.  Dr. 
Barry Baines, the leading advocate for ethical wills today, uses this 
comparison:  “Legal wills bequeath valuables, while ethical wills 
bequeath values.” 
Harris, supra note 51, at 22. 
64 28 N.W. 353 (Wis. 1886).  In this case, a father’s will conditioned his grandson’s 
inheritance on the grandson reaching thirty years of age.  Id. at 360.  In addition, the 
property was conditioned on the grandson being mature, as determined by the trustee.  Id.  
The court ruled that the condition was valid and did not violate public policy because 
people can transfer their property as they see fit.  Id. 
65 Id. at 355.  Specifically, the part of the will that stipulated that the grandson will 
receive the principal of the money only when he reached the age of thirty stated: 
I give . . . my grandson . . . the sum of ten thousand dollars; said sum 
to be invested and put to use, and the interest arising therefrom, or so 
much as said child’s guardian and my executors, hereinafter 
mentioned, may consider proper and necessary, be used for the 
support and education of said child, and at his majority the 
unexpended interest from said principal sum be paid him, and the 
interest on said sum annually thereafter until he arrives at the age of 
thirty years, at which time I will and direct that my executors pay to 
said Edward Morris one half of said ten thousand dollars, and one 
thousand dollars each year thereafter, together with all interest earned, 
until the balance of said ten thousand dollars hereby willed to him has 
been paid:  provided, however, that said Edward Morris has in the 
mean time learned some useful trade, business, or profession, and is of 
good moral character, my executors to determine whether said child 
has fully complied with said proviso before any payments from the 
principal sum are made to him. 
Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 360.  The court further stated that the age restriction was also reasonable and the 
other requirements stated in the condition were capable of performance by any person of 
ordinary intelligence.  Id. at 362. 
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given in installments so that the beneficiary can learn how to handle 
money in increments along the way.68   
Today, many individuals exercise a great deal of freedom in 
selecting and describing behavioral incentives in their trusts.69  Although 
most states have not specifically addressed the issue of policing the 
freedom of incentive conditions, the Restatement (Third) of Trusts sets 
forth guidelines in evaluating the validity of a given condition.70  
D. The Restatement’s Treatment of Incentive Conditions 
The Restatement (Third) of Trusts addresses the requirements and 
validity of incentive conditions.71  In order to allow and limit the use of 
trusts, the Restatement has proposed three conditions that, if not fully 
satisfied, will invalidate an incentive condition.72  According to 
Restatement section 29, a trust or provision in a trust is invalid if it 
requires the beneficiary to commit a criminal or tortious act, if it violates 
the applicable Rule Against Perpetuities, or if it is against public policy.73  
In the instance that one of the three situations in section 29 is present in a 
                                                 
68 Financial Planning Ass’n, supra note 56.  An example of a trust with installment 
payments is when an individual makes a trust where the beneficiary is to receive a certain 
amount of money when the individual turns eighteen, twenty, twenty-five, and the 
remainder when he turns thirty. 
69 Langley & Gandara, supra note 51, at D1.  One attorney has described the incentive 
condition by saying that the only limit of the provisions is the imagination.  Id. 
70 See infra Part II.D. 
71 See infra Part II.D. 
72 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 cmt. i (2003).  Specifically, the Restatement 
reads:  “An intended trust or trust provision is invalid if:  (a) its purpose is unlawful or its 
performance calls for the commission of a criminal or tortious act; (b) it violates rules 
relating to perpetuities; or (c) it is contrary to public policy.”  Id. 
73 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 (2003).  Regarding the Rule Against Perpetuities: 
The fundamental policy assumption of the Rule against Perpetuities is 
that vested interests are not objectionable, but contingent interests are.  
The Rule against Perpetuities limits the time during which property 
can be made subject to contingent interests to “lives in being plus 21 
years.” . . .  The Rule has two basic purposes:  (1) to keep property 
marketable and available for productive development in accordance 
with market demands; and (2) to limit “dead hand” control over the 
property, which prevents the current owners from using the property 
to respond to present needs.  The second purpose is implemented by 
curbing trusts, which, after a period of time and change in 
circumstances, tie up the family in disadvantageous and undesirable 
arrangements, leaving the beneficiaries unable to meet current newly 
arising exigencies.  In addition, if not limited in their duration, trusts 
would tend to create a permanent class of rich families, whose wealth 
would not depend on their abilities. 
DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 27. 
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trust, the validity of the trust as a whole depends on whether the 
unlawful provision can be appropriately modified or separated from the 
other provisions without defeating the testator’s intent.74   
Examining the provisions in section 29, the first two clauses can be 
easily interpreted and are less objective than the third clause regarding 
public policy, which can be interpreted differently by different courts.75  
                                                 
74 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 cmt. c (2003). 
75 Id. § 29 cmt. i.  Clause (a) addresses situations that involve impermissible purposes or 
provisions of the trust itself.  Id. § 29 cmt. b.  In general, if a trust provision requires the 
commission of a criminal or tortious act by the trustee, the provision is invalid.  Id. § 29 
cmt. c.  For example: 
[W]here several persons establish a fund to be held in trust for the 
purpose of securing, through bribery, legislation or administrative 
action favorable to their business activities, the intended trust is 
unenforceable. Similarly, an intended trust or provision to participate 
in an unlawful business, such as the marketing of legally prohibited 
substances or the unlicensed practice of medicine or law, is 
unenforceable; and a direction to operate a factory on certain land is 
unenforceable if the factory operation would be a tortious nuisance to 
the owners of adjoining lots or would be in violation of environmental 
law. 
Id.  Public policy also forbids trust provisions that tend to undermine proper 
administration of trusts.  Id. § 29 cmts. f, i.  Further, a trust incentive provision may be 
invalid because the purpose that provision serves is fraudulent or unlawful or if the 
provision is included for an unlawful consideration.  Id. § 29 cmt. d. 
For example, the owner of property might transfer it to another who 
agrees to hold it in trust for the transferor or another with the purpose 
being to conceal the interest of the transferor or other person, not 
merely for reasons of privacy but in order to mislead the government 
or others with respect to the true beneficial interests in the property. 
Such a case may arise where a person pays money to another pursuant 
to an oral agreement that the funds will be held in trust for the payor 
and returned upon demand, intentionally creating a deceptive 
appearance of ownership in the payee and thereby inducing a third 
person to make a loan to the payee. Or a person may purchase land or 
securities and, for the purpose of defrauding creditors or of evading a 
prohibition or limitation in a statute, have title placed in the name of 
another, who agrees to hold the property upon a trust for the 
purchaser. 
Id.  In addition, clause (b) is also less objective in nature because it suggests that a trust 
provision must not violate a state’s Rule Against Perpetuities.  Id. § 29 cmt. e.  According to 
this rule, a condition in a trust automatically fails if the trust does not have at least one 
definite beneficiary or does not describe at least one potential beneficiary within the 
requirements of the rule against perpetuities.  Id. § 29 cmt. g.  The Restatement specifically 
states that “a private trust fails unless the trust has one or more definite beneficiaries or 
provides for one or more beneficiaries to be ascertained within the requirements of the 
applicable rule against perpetuities.” Id.  Further, according to the Restatement’s proposed 
Rule Against Perpetuities, “[t]he period of the rule against perpetuities in donative 
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Public policy concerns arise, for example, in provisions that interfere 
with the beneficiary’s freedom to marry or religious freedom.76  These 
examples are not the only incentive conditions that will invalidate a trust 
provision.77  According to the comments of the Restatement, the third 
clause of public policy is usually associated with dead-hand control.78  
The goal of the clause is to reflect a compromise between the free 
disposition of privately owned property and other social values.79  
Although an individual is free to give to or withhold property from 
another during his lifetime, it does not follow that the individual can 
attach whatever terms or conditions he chooses to a trust.80  However, 
neither simple nor precise rules of validity or invalidity exist when 
applying the rule that an incentive condition must not violate public 
policy.81   
Regarding the public policy of promoting personal habits, the 
Restatement provides that a provision in an otherwise effective transfer 
is generally valid when the provision is aimed at preventing the 
acquisition or retention of a property interest based on a specific 
beneficiary’s personal habit.82  The Restatement also takes the position 
                                                                                                             
transfers is 21 years after lives in being (the measuring lives) at the time the period of the 
rule begins to run.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 1.1 (1983). 
76 Wells, Marble & Hurst PLLC, supra note 58.  Examples of provisions relating to 
marriage that may violate public policy pertain to limiting the selection of a spouse or 
unduly postponing marriage.  Id. 
77 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 cmt. a (2003).  Other examples of ways to 
invalidate a trust  include an illegal or unethical act of the trustee, a beneficiary, or a third 
person.  BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 34, § 44.  Examples of invalidating causes that are 
connected to the creation of a trust include cases of misrepresentation of fact, undue 
influence, duress, and mistake.  Id.  For example, a court held that a trust was invalid when 
beneficiaries made false statements to a settlor about the status of a person claiming to be 
the settlor’s son and influenced the settlor to exclude his real son.  Kinney v. St. Louis Trust 
Co., 143 S.W.2d 250 (Mo. 1940).  According to the Restatement, “[a] transfer in trust or 
declaration of trust can be set aside, or the terms of a trust can be reformed, upon the same 
grounds as those upon which a transfer of property not in trust can be set aside or 
reformed.”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 12 (2003). 
78 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 cmt. i (2003).  Dead-hand control is where the 
person who gave his money away makes provisions in his trust that enables him to control 
the actions of another even after he as passed away.  Id.; see infra note 197 and 
accompanying text. 
79 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 cmt. i (2003).  The Restatement recognizes that 
the balance between free disposition of private property and social values may create a 
burden on the courts to interpret and enforce the interests and conditions of the deceased 
individual.  Id. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP. § 8.2 (1983).  Specifically, “[a]n otherwise effective 
provision in a donative transfer which is designed to prevent the acquisition or retention of 
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that using restraints to induce or eliminate personal habits is not against 
public policy.83  However, a closer look at specific cases illustrates the 
difficulty in allowing any promotion or restraint on a personal habit.84 
E. Case and Individual Treatment of Incentive Conditions 
Traditionally, courts have upheld family incentive conditions written 
to promote or restrain a beneficiary’s personal conduct unless the 
conditions violated public policy.85  However, various court 
interpretations and applications of whether a condition violates public 
policy have led to conflict and confusion.86  The case law in this Part 
discusses generally acceptable and unacceptable conditions regarding 
the validity of family incentive trusts involving in terrorem provisions, 
marriage, family relationships, religion, and the condition’s language.87   
                                                                                                             
an interest in property on account of the transferee acquiring or persisting in specified 
personal habits is valid.”  Id.  Personal habits can, for example, relate to the beneficiary’s 
health by conditioning wealth on a beneficiary not smoking.  Clark Hill PLC, supra note 58. 
83 Id.  For instance, while a testator may attach conditions on a beneficiary’s choice of 
religion, generally a testator cannot attach a restraint on a beneficiary’s right to marry.  See 
infra Parts II.E.2–3. 
84 See infra Part II.E. 
85 Jeffrey G. Sherman, Posthumous Meddling:  An Instrumentalist Theory of Testamentary 
Restraints on Conjugal and Religious Choices, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 1273, 1276 (1999).  Also, the 
Restatement sets forth the idea that incentive conditions pertaining to control personal 
conduct is valid unless it is against public policy or violates another law.  RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF PROP. § 5.1 (1983).  The Restatement provides that “[u]nless contrary to public 
policy or violative of some rule of law, a provision . . . designed to prevent the acquisition 
or retention of an interest in property in the event of any failure on the part of the 
transferee to comply with a restraint on personal conduct is valid.”  Id.  A trust or a 
provision in the terms of a trust is invalid if its enforcement would be against public policy, 
even though its performance does not involve the commission of a criminal or tortious act 
by the trustee.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 62 (1959); Sherman, supra, at 1277 
(quoting Lewis v. Searles, 452 S.W.2d 153 (Mo. 1970)). 
86 See infra note 109 and accompanying text. 
87 See infra Parts II.E.1–3. 
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1. In Terrorem Provisions 
“In terrorem” is defined as “by way of threat; as a warning.”88  For 
example, in Estate of Lewis,89 the court examined the validity of an “anti-
harassment clause,” where a settlor depicted in her trust that one trustee 
was to determine if another had harassed him concerning matters related 
to the money in the trust.90  If the first trustee reported that the second 
trustee had harassed him, the first trustee was entitled to the second 
trustee’s share.91  One of the beneficiaries objected to the anti-harassment 
clause, claiming that it was an incentive condition that was against 
public policy, and thus it was unenforceable.92  He stated that the clause 
subjected him to an arbitrary and capricious withholding of life-
sustaining funds, allowed the beneficiaries to concoct a story that would 
suspend his payments, and gave the trustees the loose right to determine 
                                                 
88 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 839 (8th ed. 1999).  In addition, “in terrorem” has been 
defined as “[i]n terror, or warning; by way of threat.”  U.S. Nat’l Bank of Portland v. 
Snodgrass, 275 P.2d 860, 871 (Or. 1954).  “The term is applied to gifts or legacies given on 
conditions subsequent, because it is said that the possibility of losing the gift tends to 
inspire fear or dread.”  Id.; see infra notes 115–18 and accompanying text.  The term is 
derived from a Latin word meaning “in fear.”  General Publ’g Group, Law.com Dictionary 
(2005), http://dictionary.law.com/default2.asp?typed=in+terrorem&type=1&submit1.x= 
58&submit1.y=7.  Further, one dictionary defines “in terrorem” as: 
[A] provision in a will which threatens that if anyone challenges the 
legality of the will or any part of it, then that person will be cut off or 
given only a dollar, instead of getting the full gift provided in the will.  
The clause is intended to discourage beneficiaries from causing a legal 
ruckus after the will writer is gone. 
Id. 
89 770 A.2d 619 (Me. 2001).  In this case, the court ruled that the anti-harassment 
condition was valid at the time of the decision because the issue was not yet ripe.  Id. at 624. 
90 Id. at 619.  The settlor in Lewis was survived by three sons, David, Paul, and the 
contestant, Lawrence.  Id. at 621.  In addition to representing the testatrix, the attorney also 
represented the settlor’s son, David, in estate planning matters and had prepared a will and 
trust for Lawrence in 1972.  Id.  After the death of the testatrix, her sons, David and Paul, 
and the attorney were informally appointed as personal representatives of the estate.  Id.  
Lawrence also claimed that the attorney’s dual representation created undue influence.  Id.  
The anti-harassment clause in Ms. Lewis’ will provided: 
Provided however, that the Trustees may, in their sole and absolute 
discretion, suspend making any and all payments to or for the benefit 
of LAWRENCE LEWIS at any time when in the judgment of the 
Trustees, LAWRENCE LEWIS is harassing any beneficiary or any 
Trustee, or their agents, of any trust created hereunder. 
Id. at 622–23. 
91 Id. at 619. 
92 Id. at 622–23.  Lawrence objected to the clause when the personal representatives filed 
for formal probate of the will and formal appointment of personal representatives.  Id. 
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harassment.93  The Supreme Court of Maine stated that the clause was 
not against public policy, as of yet.94  The court held that the clause was 
valid because the in terrorem provision issue depended on possible 
future facts that did not exist at that time.95   
While the court in Maine left the clause open to future litigation 
based on ripeness, other states, such as Indiana, bar in terrorem clauses 
altogether.96  In addition, particular conditions that contain restraints on 
marriage are usually considered in terrorem, forcing courts to determine 
the validity of the conditions.97 
2. Marriage and Family Relationships 
An individual may also attempt to condition the amount of money 
that a beneficiary receives on the beneficiary’s marital and family 
                                                 
93 Id. at 623.  Compare Webster v. Morris, 28 N.W. 353, 361 (Wis. 1886) (holding the clause 
requiring the beneficiary to reach thirty years of age and be mature was in terrorem and 
against public policy), with Estate of Lewis, 770 A.2d 619, 624 (Me. 2001) (holding that a 
clause requiring the beneficiary to not harass other potential beneficiaries was valid). 
94 Estate of Lewis, 770 A.2d at 624.  The probate court declined to determine that the anti-
harassment clause in the trust was, as a matter of law, against public policy and thus 
unenforceable.  Id. at 623.  The probate court declined to find any undue influence 
regarding the attorney’s duel representation of Ms. Lewis and David because undue 
influence requires more proof than what Lawrence provided.  Id. at 622.  The court stated 
its intention to leave open the question as to future enforceability of the anti-harassment 
clause and awarded Lawrence attorney fees on the basis of probable cause.  Id. at 621.  On 
appeal, the beneficiary challenged the court’s decision not to strike the anti-harassment 
clause.  Id. at 624.  Lawrence also challenged the probate court’s decision regarding undue 
influence, and the Supreme Court of Maine upheld the probate court’s decision, reasoning 
that there was no undue influence.  Id.  The personal representatives filed a cross-appeal, 
challenging the court’s statement on an unripe issue of future litigation over the anti-
harassment clause and the court’s award of attorney fees to Lawrence.  Id. at 621, 624. 
95 Id. at 624.  Further, the Supreme Court of Maine upheld the award of attorney fees to 
Lawrence because his claims were made in good faith.  Id. at 625. 
96 IND. CODE § 29-1-6-2 (2004).  Specifically, the statute states: 
If, in any will admitted to probate in any of the courts of this state, 
there is a provision or provisions providing that if any beneficiary 
thereunder shall take any proceeding to contest such will or to prevent 
the admission thereof to probate, or provisions to that effect, such 
beneficiary shall thereby forfeit any benefit which said will made for 
said beneficiary, such provision or provisions shall be void and of no 
force or effect. 
Id. 
97 U.S. Nat’l Bank of Portland v. Snodgrass, 275 P.2d 860, 871 (Or. 1954).  According to 
the court, it is the absence of a gift that determines whether a condition is a threat under the 
in terrorem rule, making the condition invalid.  Id.; see also infra Part II.E.2. 
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relationships.98  A provision of a will or a trust is usually invalid if it 
tends to encourage disruption or formation of a family relationship.99  
Some courts have invalidated discriminatory regulations, such as a 
condition that an individual must marry someone of a particular racial, 
ethnic, or religious background.100   
As a general rule, conditions pertaining to family relationships are 
invalid.101  In Maddox v. Maddox,102 a provision in a will allowed an 
inheritance to go to a woman only if she married one of six men.103  The 
Virginia Supreme Court held that the condition was void as an 
unreasonable restraint on marriage.104  
                                                 
98 See infra notes 101–14 and accompanying text (describing various court cases 
involving restraints on marriage). 
99 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 cmt. i (2003); see also infra notes 101–14 and 
accompanying text.  Exceptions to the rule exist.  See infra notes 106–09 and accompanying 
text.  Regarding what is left of a trust after an individual provision is held invalid, the 
Restatement gives both the courts and the trustees the power to eliminate provisions at 
their discretion.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 66 (2003).  According to the 
Restatement: 
(1)  The court may modify an administrative or distributive provision 
of a trust, or direct or permit the trustee to deviate from an 
administrative or distributive provision, if because of circumstances 
not anticipated by the settlor the modification or deviation will further 
the purposes of the trust.  (2) If a trustee knows or should know of 
circumstances that justify judicial action under Subsection (1) with 
respect to an administrative provision, and of the potential of those 
circumstances to cause substantial harm to the trust or its beneficiaries, 
the trustee has a duty to petition the court for appropriate modification 
of or deviation from the terms of the trust. 
Id. 
100 Hickok, supra note 4, at 17; see, e.g., IND. CODE § 29-1-6-2 (2004) (stating that a 
provision in a will or trust that puts a restraint on marriage is acceptable, but the actual 
condition is void).  A will in which a husband gave his wife land containing the restriction 
that the wife remained a widow was not a restraint on marriage because the condition 
contained only words of limitation.  Summit v. Yount, 9 N.E. 582, 582–84 (Ind. 1886).  
Compare Crawford v. Thompson, 91 Ind. 266, 277 (1883) (holding invalid a provision in a 
will stating that a girl will not get an annual amount of money set aside for her if she 
married a second time), with Summit, 9 N.E. at 582–84 (holding valid a provision in a will 
that limited a beneficiary’s inheritance on her not marrying). 
101 See infra notes 109–14 and accompanying text. 
102 52 Va. 804 (1854).  In this case, the Virginia Supreme Court found that a provision that 
restrained a daughter’s choice of spouses to about six men was unreasonable and void.  Id. 
at 808–09. 
103 Id. at 805.  In this case, a father stated in his will that the daughter would get the 
remainder of his estate as long as she remained a member of a certain society.  Id.  Once she 
married a man who was not a member of the society, it was the society’s rule to not allow 
the daughter to be in the society, and thus the daughter could not meet the condition.  Id. 
104 Id. at 808–09. 
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However, a valid exception to the rule is the termination of a 
spouse’s interest in a testator’s trust if the testator’s spouse remarries.105  
In Lewis v. Searles,106 a will contained a provision that disallowed giving 
property to the testator’s spouse if she remarried.107  The Missouri 
Supreme Court held that the provision was not against public policy 
because it did not punish the testator’s spouse for marrying; rather, it 
was intended to aid the testator’s spouse while single.108  The court 
discussed the conflict and confusion surrounding the restraint of 
marriage, explaining that the general rule that a restraint on marriage 
was void against public policy had been “eaten out with exceptions.”109 
Most courts have held that a trust with a condition that the 
beneficiary divorce or separate from his or her spouse is against public 
policy and therefore invalid, but this principle is subject to certain 
                                                 
105 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 cmt. j (2003). 
106 452 S.W.2d 153 (Mo. 1970).  In this case, a plaintiff sought to void a condition in a will 
that stated the plaintiff would get property only if she remained unmarried.  Id. at 154.  The 
court ruled that the condition was valid because it was intended not to punish but to aid 
the plaintiff while single.  Id. at 159. 
107 Id. at 154.  Specifically, the will stated: 
I devise to my niece, Hattie L. Lewis, all of my real and personal 
property of which I may die seized and possessed, so long as she 
remains single and unmarried. In the event that the said Hattie L. 
Lewis shall marry, then and in this event I desire that all of my 
property, both real and personal be divided equally between my nieces 
and nephews as follows, to the said Hattie L. Lewis, an undivided one 
third, to Letitia A. LaForge, wife of A. C. LaForge, an undivided one 
third, and to James R. Lewis an undivided one third. 
Id. 
108 Id. at 159. 
109 Id. at 155.  The court stated that modern opinion seems to be that the right of the 
donor to attach conditions pertaining to marriage will outweigh the maxim that marriage 
should be free, except where the conditions have no reasonable purpose.  Id.  Specifically, 
the court stated: 
The history of this most ancient rule is discussed in that Annotation. It 
is obvious that the cases on the subject are both conflicting and 
confusing, but that most, if not all, courts still give lip service to the 
doctrine. The tendency, however, is to consider whether, under the 
circumstances, the provision serves a legitimate purpose. And one 
reason which the author mentions as most commonly applied is the 
desire to furnish support to the devisee while single. Much confusion 
has developed in attempts to determine whether such a provision, in 
any given case, is a limitation or a condition. It has been indicated that 
generally a devise which is to be reduced in the event of marriage is 
held to be a condition subsequent. 
Id. 
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exceptions and qualifications.110  For example, the Alabama Supreme 
Court, in Brizendine v. American Trust & Savings Bank,111 held that a 
condition precedent regarding the real estate of the testatrix given to her 
son was void.112  The condition required that he give up living with, or 
having anything to do with, a named woman to whom he legally 
married three months before the execution of the will.113  The court 
found it evident that the testatrix intended to bring about a separation or 
divorce between her son and his wife, concluding that the condition was 
void against public policy.114   
In contrast, in United States National Bank of Portland v. Snodgrass115 
the Oregon Supreme Court held that a condition in a trust providing that 
the testator’s daughter was to receive a certain sum if she proved to the 
satisfaction of the trustee that she had not embraced the Catholic faith or 
married a man of that faith was valid.116  The court reasoned that an 
                                                 
110 J.F. Ghent, Annotation, Wills:  Validity of Condition of Gift Depending on Divorce or 
Separation, 14 A.L.R.3d 1219, (1967).  An example of an exception is support for female 
recipients. 
111 101 So. 618 (Ala. 1924).  The court ruled that a condition requiring a son to not 
associate with his wife was void because it was against public policy.  Id. at 622. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. at 619.  Specifically, the will stated: 
The other half of my real estate I will bequeath to my own son, Frank 
L. Brizendine, provided he will reform, and give up living with, or 
having anything to do with this Mrs. Moore by name, whom he now 
lives with, and who alienated Frank’s affections from his legitimate 
wife and son Frank Brizendine, Jr., and he, Frank Brizendine, shall not 
have a dollar of my real estate, unless he forsakes her (Mrs. Moore) 
and has nothing to do with her for a period of seven years, and proves 
that he has given her, Mrs. Moore, up. 
Id. at 618. 
114 Id. at 622. 
115 275 P.2d 860 (Or. 1954).  In this case, the Oregon Supreme Court held that a condition 
in a trust requiring that an individual neither embrace the Catholic faith nor marry 
someone who was Catholic was valid.  Id. at 872. 
116 Id.  Specifically, the will provided: 
When my said daughter shall have attained the age of thirty-two years 
and upon my death, that is to say, when these two events occur, my 
trustee is authorized and directed to transfer, assign and/or pay over 
to my said daughter Merle the whole of the trust fund of Fifteen 
Thousand ($ 15,000.00) Dollars, or the one-half (1/2) of the entire estate 
if sum is more than Thirty Thousand ($ 30,000.00) Dollars, provided 
she shall have proved conclusively to my trustee and to its entire 
satisfaction that she has not embraced, nor become a member of, the 
Catholic faith nor ever married to a man of such faith. In the event my 
daughter predeceases me, or having survived me dies prior to 
attaining the age of thirty-two years or if living becomes ineligible to 
receive the trust fund then I direct the principal of such trust fund to be 
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individual has great freedom to dispose of his property before and after 
his death.117  In addition to analyzing the marriage aspect of the 
condition, the court also analyzed and validated the condition pertaining 
to religion based on freedom of expression even though the daughter 
claimed that the incentive condition restricted her constitutional freedom 
of religion.118 
3. Religion 
The general rule regarding a testator’s right to devise conditions 
relating to religious freedom is that individuals are free, during their 
lives, to promote their religious views among others.119  The court in 
                                                                                                             
divided as follows:  —In case either my wife or daughter forfeit their 
right to the trust fund, by death or otherwise, I want one or both of 
said funds divided between the following parties share and share alike 
. . . . 
Id. at 862.  The lower court concluded that the conditions were valid.  Id.  The daughter 
appealed the lower court’s ruling, arguing that the conditions were against public policy 
because she was denied property based solely on her marriage, for she did not herself 
become Catholic.  Id. 
117 Id. at 864.  Further, the court stated: 
Two general and cardinal propositions give direction and limitation to 
our consideration. One is the traditionally great freedom that the law 
confers on the individual with respect to the disposition of his 
property, both before and after death. . . .  The right of a testator to 
attach to a gift in his will any lawful terms he sees fit, no matter how 
whimsical or capricious, is widely, if not universally, recognized. 
Conditions which are regarded as contrary to law or public policy, 
which are impossible of performance, or which are too vague and 
uncertain in their phraseology to disclose the actual intention of the 
testator, will not, however, be enforced, although it is established that 
in considering any testamentary condition the court must indulge a 
presumption in favor of its validity. When questions arise as to 
conditions or provisions being void as being against the public good or 
against public policy, great caution is necessary in considering them; at 
different times very different views have been entertained as to what is 
injurious to the public. 
Id. (citation omitted); see also Clayton’s Estate, 13 Pa. D. & C. 413 (Pa. D. & C. 1930) (holding 
that a similar provision in the will was valid because, operating only on the choice of a 
wife, it was too remote to be regarded as coercive of religious faith). 
118 Snodgrass, 275 P.2d at 860–72; see infra Part II.E.3. 
119 Shapira v. Union Nat’l Bank, 315 N.E.2d 825, 829 (Ohio Ct. App. 1974); see 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 cmt. k (2003).  In Shapira, a will contained a clause 
that conditioned a son’s inheritance on his marriage to a Jewish girl whose parents were 
both Jewish.  315 N.E.2d at 826.  The court ruled that the religious condition was valid 
because the testator was not enforcing religion on the son; rather, the will enforced a 
restriction upon the son’s inheritance.  Id. at 832.  The court reasoned that the provision was 
not a full restraint on marriage or religion, and thus it was a reasonable restraint.  Id.  But 
see Maddox v. Maddox, 52 Va. 804 (1854) (voiding a provision in a will that allowed an 
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Snodgrass reasoned that an individual has the power to completely 
disinherit someone and is not forced to give a reason for the 
disinheritance.120  Although the court noted that it seemed harsh and 
cruel that a parent would disinherit his child in the manner used in this 
case, no court can interfere as long as the motive is not completely 
unreasonable.121   
Similar to the opinion in Snodgrass, the Ohio Court of Common Pleas 
declared that a father may include a provision in his will that required 
his son to marry a Jewish woman with Jewish parents in order to receive 
his property in Shapira v. Union National Bank.122  Further, the court in 
                                                                                                             
inheritance to go to a woman only if she married one of six named men).  The court held 
that the condition was an unreasonable restraint on marriage.  Id. at 805.  Individuals may 
also create charitable trusts during their lifetime or at death to support a chosen religion.  
Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 (2003) (“Charitable trust purposes include:  
(a) the relief of poverty; (b) the advancement of knowledge or education; (c) the 
advancement of religion; (d) the promotion of health; (e) governmental or municipal 
purposes; and (f) other purposes that are beneficial to the community.”). 
120 275 P.2d at 865.  Further, the court stated that the father could have given his wealth 
to an entity that would express adverse views of a particular religion for which he 
harbored ill feelings.  Id.  The court noted that the father has a unique right to freedom of 
expression, which has built our country.  Id. at 864.  Specifically, the court stated: 
It is this unique right to freedom of expression, whether manifested in 
the political forum, the church chancel or other arenas of thought and 
action, that has not only contributed so much to the greatness of our 
country and has given it such a distinctive and distinguished place in 
the world family of nations but has given additional vitality and 
substance to our valued religious freedom. . . .  The other [cardinal 
proposition] is that greater freedom, the freedom of opinion and right 
to expression in political and religious matters, together with the 
incidental and corollary right to implement the attainment of the 
ultimate and favored objectives of the religious teaching and social or 
political philosophy to which an individual subscribes. We do not 
intend to imply hereby that the right to devise or bequeath property is 
in any way dependent upon or related to the constitutional guarantees 
of freedom of speech. 
Id. 
121 Id. at 865.  The court stated: 
[W]hile it seems harsh and cruel that a parent should disinherit one of 
his children and devise his property to others, or cut them all off and 
devise it to strangers, from some unworthy motive, yet so long as that 
motive, whether from pride or aversion or spite or prejudice, is not resolvable 
into mental perversion, no court can interfere. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
122 315 N.E.2d 825, 826 (Ohio Ct App. 1974).  The son whose father’s will contained a 
provision that he must marry a Jewish woman argued that the provision was unreasonable 
and that the court should apply the Maddox court’s reasoning because he claimed that the 
number of eligible Jewish females in this country was a small minority of the population.  
Id. at 831.  The court determined that the Maddox decision and reasoning should not carry 
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Shapira examined the apparent intent of the testator and stated that he 
unmistakably intended that his wealth be used to encourage the 
preservation of the Jewish faith and blood.123  Thus, the court found that 
the purpose of the provision was not merely a negative provision aimed 
to punish the son for not meeting the condition, but was meant to help 
support the testator’s religion.124   
Yet, according to the Restatement, a trust provision is usually invalid 
if the provision creates financial pressure regarding the future religious 
choices of beneficiaries.125  Examining a condition aimed to control an 
individual’s religious conduct, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in 
Drace v. Klinedinst126 held that the disputed condition contained in the 
testator’s will was against public policy, and thus it was invalid.127  The 
court used Section III of the Pennsylvania Bill of Rights, which declares 
that no human authority can control or interfere with the rights of 
conscience, to aid in its decision.128  The will provided that the heirs 
could keep the estate as long as they “remained faithful” to a particular 
religion, but if any of them forsook this religion, then the estate should 
pass to the children of the testator’s son who “remain[ed] true” to this 
religion.129  The children “remained faithful” for some time before 
                                                                                                             
over because, although the number of eligible Jewish women was a minority, the provision 
was not unreasonable to the point of the unreasonable provision in Maddox, where a girl 
had only a handful of men to marry.  Id. 
123 Id. at 832.  Further evidence of the father’s goal to preserve the Jewish faith is that if 
his son did not meet the condition and the money did not go to his son, then the money 
would go to the State of Israel.  Id.  The court stated that whether the father’s decision was 
wise was not for the court to determine, but the court had a duty to honor the testator’s 
intention within the limitations of the law and public policy.  Id.  The court stated that 
“[t]he prerogative granted to a testator by the laws of this state to dispose of his estate 
according to his conscience is entitled to as much judicial protection and enforcement as the 
prerogative of a beneficiary to receive an inheritance.”  Id. 
124 Id. 
125 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 cmt. k (2003).  A trust condition offering a 
financial inducement to accept or reject a particular faith or set of beliefs about religion is 
usually invalid.  Id. 
126 118 A. 907 (Pa. 1922).  The court held that a condition that required an individual 




129 Id. at 908.  The decedent devised three pieces of land to his son for the term of his 
natural life.  Id.  After the son’s death, the land was to go to the children “provided they 
remained faithful to a particular religion; and, in case any of them forsook this religion, 
‘then and in that case, to the remaining children of my said son who remain true’ to this 
religion.”  Id.  If a child did not remain faithful, the child’s interest would be forfeited and 
given to other named relatives.  Id. 
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leaving that church and joining another.130  The court reasoned that the 
enforcement of the forfeiture would be contrary to public policy.131 
Fifty years later, the same Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld a 
condition based on religion in In re Estate of Laning.132  The court held 
that the provision requiring the plaintiffs to remain “members in good 
standing of the Presbyterian Church” was valid because the condition 
was not illegal, immoral, tortious, or productive of any social evil.133  The 
court noted that there may have been an impact on freedom of religion, 
but the condition did not impose a loss on the heirs because they never 
had any claim upon the estate of the testatrix in the first place.134  The 
court saw no basis upon which to deny the testatrix the power to 
distribute her property by stipulating that the heirs maintain good 
standing in the Presbyterian Church.135 
The Laning court reconciled the decisions in Laning and Drace by 
explaining the difference between interpretations of the language in the 
conditions of the wills.136  Enforcing the “remain true” condition in Drace 
would require a determination of the doctrines of that religion and an 
inquiry as to whether or not the heirs had in fact “remained true” to 
those doctrines.137  The court reasoned that such questions are clearly 
improper for a civil court to determine.138  Thus, in addition to looking at 
the validity of the condition itself, courts look to the language of the 
                                                 
130 Id.  When the children sought to sell the property, the purchaser questioned the 
marketability of the title, fearing that a breach of the religious condition might have 
divested the children of title.  Id. 
131 Id. at 909.  Primarily, the court held that the language of the will was not sufficient to 
render defeasible the estate divested.  Id.  Even if the language would otherwise create a 
defeasible interest, the enforcement of the forfeiture would violate public policy of the 
state.  Id. 
132 339 A.2d 520 (Pa. 1975).  In this case, the court ruled that a provision requiring an 
individual to be a member in good standing of a particular church was valid.  Id. at 521, 
524. 
133 Id. At 521.  The trial court ruled in favor of appellees.  Id. at 522.  On appeal, the court 
reversed the trial court’s decision.  Id. at 526. 
134 Id. at 526.  The court noted that the only way the heirs had any initial interest in the 
estate was to successfully satisfy the conditions the testatrix had attached to the will.  Id. 
135 Id. at 524. 
136 Id. at 522. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. at 523.  Not only would the condition in Drace have required improper inquiries 
into the content of religious doctrine, but the evaluation would have been magnified by the 
need to probe into the beliefs of the heirs.  Id. 
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condition and the standards by which to measure the behavior of an 
individual in order to determine the validity of an incentive condition.139 
4. Clear Language and Measurable Conditions 
Regarding the language and evaluation of the proposed condition, 
the Illinois Supreme Court in Cassem v. Kennedy140 described the need for 
easily measurable conditions.141  The will in Cassem provided that 
because a son was “wild, unsettled and irregular in his habits,” the son 
should not acquire the settlor’s property until the son “settles down in 
life and gets married” or reaches the age of forty.142  The court held that 
the condition was not void for uncertainty because it was easy to 
determine whether he was married or had attained the age of forty.143   
When drafting a condition in a will, testators often create their own 
dictionaries, requiring “the art” of judicial interpretation.144  In In re 
Hogg’s Estate,145 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court attempted to set forth a 
standard by which to interpret a testator’s language in an incentive 
condition.146  According to the court, the testator’s intent is the most 
important factor, for the language is simply a means of expression.147 
In addition to the mere language of the condition, the issue of 
whether the beneficiary has lived up to specified behavior expressed in 
the will is subject to individual variations of interpretation.148  Either an 
arbiter or a court has the task of determining whether the benefactor has 
breached the condition.149  When the personal conduct stipulated is fairly 
definite in nature, such as a requirement that an heir abstain from 
gambling or using intoxicating liquor, the task of evaluating the heir’s 
                                                 
139 See infra Part II.E.4. 
140 35 N.E. 738 (Ill. 1893).  In this case, a provision requiring that a son mature was held 
valid even though it was written in uncertain terms.  Id. at 739. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. at 738.  Specifically, the language in the trust read:  “As my son, Joseph Downey, is 
wild, unsettled and irregular in his habits, it is my will and desire that he shall not enjoy 
the benefit of this devise till he settles down in life and gets married, or until he arrives at 
the age of forty years . . . .”  Id. 
143 Id. at 739. 
144 In re Funk Estate, 45 A.2d 67, 70 (Pa. 1946). 
145 196 A. 503 (Pa. 1938).  In this case, the court tried to make a standard involving the 
testator’s intent for the language of an incentive condition.  Id. at 505. 
146 Id. (“[T]he test is what [the testator’s] words meant to him and the thought which he 
intended to convey by them; language being but a medium of expression, the object of 
interpretation is to ascertain its import as used by the one who employs it.”). 
147 Id. 
148 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP. § 8.2 cmt. b (1983). 
149 Id. 
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conduct is usually uncomplicated and therefore feasible.150  Where no 
arbiter is designated and the criteria of the personal conduct are vaguely 
defined, courts are generally unwilling to accept the task of examining 
the condition and evaluating it to the benefactor’s conduct.151  The 
unwillingness of the courts to examine vague criteria in a condition 
normally results in a finding that the restraint is void for 
indefiniteness.152 
When the testator does not appoint a specific arbiter and the 
conditions are vague, courts have been reluctant to hold the condition 
valid.153  In Jones v. Jones,154 the Missouri Supreme Court held that an 
                                                 
150 Id.  When an arbiter is designated by the testatrix to decide whether a restraint has 
been violated, the arbiter’s determination is conclusive unless there exists a judicial finding 
that the decision was influenced by something other than an honest attempt to evaluate the 
heir’s conduct.  Id.  For example: 
O, owning Blackacre in fee simple absolute, makes an otherwise 
effective deed stating, “to my son, S, and his heirs, but if S should ever 
enter into evil ways and acquire bad habits, I reserve the right to enter 
and terminate his estate.”  Several years later, O is offered a large sum 
for Blackacre.  Without justification, O notifies S that he considers the 
condition violated and attempts to enter and terminate S’s estate.  His 
determination is not binding and an independent finding will be made 
by the court. 
Id. § 8.2 illus. 3.  Where no arbiter is designated and the criteria of the proscribed conduct is 
not so vague, the court is willing to accept the task of determining whether there has been a 
breach.  Id. § 8.2 cmt b. 
151 Id. 
152 Id.  For example: 
O, by an otherwise effective will, devises $50,000 “to my son S, on 
condition that S abandon his intemperate habits, immoral consortings 
and evil associations.”  No arbiter is designated.  A finding is 
reasonable that the condition fails for indefiniteness, given the 
difficulty in defining with any certainty the standard of conduct to 
which S is to conform.  S is entitled to the $50,000 free of any condition. 
Id. § 8.2 illus. 4.  In order to avoid invalidating a restraint because of its indefiniteness when 
the proscribed conduct is a matter of individual opinion, courts often infer that the testatrix 
intended to have a trustee act as the arbiter.  Id.  Often the trustee may be the one who acts 
as the arbiter and determines whether a restraint has been violated despite the absence of a 
specific endorsement of an arbiter in a will.  Id.  A finding is often reasonable when the 
trustee is to be the intended arbiter because the trustee is usually the surviving spouse, 
other relative, or close friend of the testatrix.  Id.  The law provides an avenue for judicial 
review to avoid unreasonable exercises of power.  Id. 
153 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP. § 8.2 cmt. b (1983).  A trustee is usually under a duty 
to the beneficiaries not to carry out a trust provision that the trustee knows or has reason to 
know is unlawful.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 cmt. e (2003).  If the trust does not 
fail, the trustee has the duty to administer the property in a lawful manner to accomplish 
the trust’s valid purposes.  Id. 
154 123 S.W. 29, 38 (Mo. 1909).  In this case, the court held that a condition was void 
because of its uncertainty.  Id. 
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incentive condition was void because of the condition’s uncertainty.155  
The testator did not provide a trustee with discretionary power to decide 
whether the conditions had been met.156  In addition, no rule or test 
existed to evaluate the beneficiary’s conduct as it related to the 
condition.157 
Further, in Farmer’s State Bank & Trust v. Mangold,158 the Illinois 
Supreme Court held that a condition that required heirs to “do that 
which is right” to receive a remainder was invalid for uncertainty.159  The 
court stated that because the purpose of the condition was to influence 
conduct, the use of “an unexpressed personal and subjective yardstick 
for an expressed objective one would distort the testator’s intent and 
make it difficult, if not impossible, for the donee to know the standard of 
conduct to which he is to conform.”160 
According to the Restatement, if a trust provision is not upheld as it 
is written and it is susceptible to adaptation to accommodate both public 
policy concerns and legitimate settlor objectives, the court may adapt the 
provision.161  Thus, a provision may fail as it was originally designed, but 
the provision may, nevertheless, be judicially reformed to accomplish the 
allowable objectives while removing or minimizing socially undesirable 
effects.162   
                                                 
155 Id.  The testator left property to his sons for twenty years.  Id. at 30.  At the expiration 
of the twenty years, if the sons could show themselves to be competent to manage the 
estate and to be “sober, industrious and not to be spendthrifts,” then the estate would be 
expanded to a fee simple.  Id. at 32.  If the sons were not reformed, they would have only a 
life estate.  Id.  Consequently, the court held that the sons received the property in fee 
simple at the death of their father.  Id. at 38. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. (quoting Schumacker’s Estate v. Reel, 61 Mo. 592, 600 (Mo. 1876)).  Further, the 
court provided: 
In every will creating legacies or trusts, there should be such certainty 
as will enable the court to carry them out.  Where such uncertainty 
exists that the court cannot see what object the testator had in view, or 
for what he intended to provide, then the legacy or trust must fail. 
Id. at 41. 
158 114 N.E.2d 797 (Ill. 1953).  In this case, the Illinois Supreme Court held that a condition 
requiring an individual to “do that which is right” was invalid because it was uncertain.  
Id. at 798, 801. 
159 Id. at 801.  The heirs were two foster children, and the trustee was the foster mother 
and wife of the testator.  Id. at 798. 
160 Id. at 799. 
161 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 cmt. i(1) (2003). 
162 Id. § 29 cmt. j.  The judicial flexibility of altering the condition eliminates an all or 
nothing decision and eases speculation and other difficulties inherent in cases related to the 
validity of incentive conditions.  Id. 
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Because people are increasingly passing down greater amounts of 
wealth, more people want to attach conditions on transfers of wealth in 
order to avoid the seemingly negative consequences of inherited 
wealth.163  Individuals must consider the validity of their conditions 
when composing them.  The Restatement sets forth some guidelines, but 
it leaves what actually violates public policy open to interpretation.164  
Further, states do not always have clear rules to determine the validity of 
the conditions.165  The next Part of this Note addresses the need for states 
to adopt statutes regarding the validity of incentive conditions in order 
to promote a testator’s freedom to distribute wealth as desired and avoid 
a mass of litigation resulting from the freedom some testators have taken 
in drafting incentive conditions.166 
III.  ANALYSIS 
In order to avoid conflict and excessive litigation, states must 
legislatively allow incentive conditions within certain limitations.167  
States should explicitly describe and codify statutory limitations to 
incentive conditions to avoid uncertainty and promote a testator’s 
freedom to distribute his wealth as he desires.168  Codifying the 
limitations on incentive conditions, while allowing all others, will also 
give beneficiaries the freedom of choice, minimize dead-hand control, 
and reduce inefficient litigation.169  Part III.A analyzes the reasons that 
states should allow incentive conditions within certain limitations.170  
Part III.B examines current case law, statutes, and the Restatements, 
finding that they do not sufficiently address incentive conditions and 
provides methods so that states can successfully devise a statute that 
adequately covers incentive conditions.171 
                                                 
163 See supra notes 5, 17 and accompanying text. 
164 See supra Part II.D. 
165 See supra Part II.B. 
166 See infra Part III. 
167 See infra Part III.A. 
168 BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 34, at § 1. 
169 See infra Part III.B. 
170 See infra Part III.A. 
171 See infra Part III.B.  The lack of state provisions may lead to greater court supervision 
with respect to incentive conditions than is presently the case.  BOGERT & BOGERT, supra 
note 34, § 1. 
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A. Rationale Supporting Incentive Conditions 
In order to give testators the power and discretion to distribute their 
wealth in a desired manner, states should allow incentive conditions.172  
Because incentive conditions permit individuals to control their 
beneficiaries’ actions and beliefs in positive ways even after they have 
passed, individuals who perceive themselves to be possible beneficiaries 
of a substantial inheritance will often feel bound to positively alter their 
lives.173 For instance, incentive conditions prohibiting the use of illegal 
drugs may result in beneficiaries choosing to abstain from the use of 
illegal drugs in order to receive a large sum of money.174  Decisions that 
positively alter a beneficiary’s behavior are desirable to the testator, the 
beneficiary, and society in general.175  The testator benefits because the 
beneficiary behaves in a way that the testator wanted him to behave; the 
beneficiary benefits because he is not using drugs and has more money; 
and society benefits because there is one less drug user in the 
community.176  For many beneficiaries, the extra incentive of a 
substantial amount of money will motivate the beneficiary to make 
healthier or more productive life choices.177  
Conditioning inherited wealth on a particular behavior also reduces 
the negative bias that may exist against inherited wealth.178  Incentive 
conditions motivate beneficiaries to display good behavior, which will 
result in a more productive community as a whole.179 Societal concerns 
regarding beneficiaries who squander their inherited dynasty decrease 
when society sees that the beneficiaries behave positively.180  If the 
community knows that a beneficiary had to actually work productively 
to receive a large amount of money through a trust, the community will 
appreciate that the money was not simply handed to the beneficiary on a 
“silver platter.”181   
                                                 
172 See infra Part III.A. 
173 See supra note 51 and accompanying text.  “Positive ways” of altering a beneficiary’s 
life is determined by the testator when the testator drafts the conditions. 
174 See supra notes 56, 59–60. 
175 See supra notes 56, 59–60. 
176 See supra notes 56, 59–60. 
177 See supra notes 56, 59–60. 
178 Langley & Gandara, supra note 51, at D1.  “Financial parenting” by means of incentive 
conditions is also a sound way to avoid having to pay estate taxes.  Id. 
179 See supra note 59. 
180 See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
181 See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
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Incentive conditions also provide testators the freedom to draft 
wide-ranging, highly specific provisions for their children’s welfare and 
to support the beliefs of the testators.182  For example, in Shapira, the 
testator’s goal of providing for the advancement of the Jewish faith 
allowed the beneficiary to decide whether he would marry a Jewish 
woman, which would cause him to receive his father’s wealth, or not 
marry a Jewish woman, which would cause the State of Israel to receive 
the inheritance.183  The court in Shapira correctly recognized the 
importance of the testator’s wish to motivate the advancement of his 
religion.184  This freedom to permit a testator to describe how he wishes 
to distribute his wealth is essential because it allows the testator to direct 
his wealth as he would if he were alive.185  The freedom to create 
incentive conditions still allows the beneficiary to control his own life as 
long as state statutes impose certain limitations on incentive 
conditions.186 
Just as an individual can disinherit someone from his will without 
providing a reason, the same individual should be allowed to articulate 
incentive conditions in trusts that limit another from receiving his 
wealth.187  Because states do not question the reasoning behind an 
individual’s decision to disinherit another, states should not scrutinize 
an incentive condition in a trust unless a major public policy flaw exists 
in the testator’s condition.188  Incentive conditions, when used correctly, 
are beneficial to reinforce the values that have already been instilled in 
the beneficiaries.189  However, incentive conditions should not punish 
                                                 
182 See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
183 See supra notes 122–24 and accompanying text. 
184 See supra notes 122–24 and accompanying text. 
185 See supra notes 122–24 and accompanying text.  However, no court will tolerate the 
condition if the action required is illegal.  See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
186 See infra Part IV for a sample statute describing the limitations. 
187 See supra note 120 and accompanying text.  If a person with a will can include or 
exclude another from his will for any reason he wants, he should be able to include or 
exclude another from his trust for any reason he wants.  U.S. Nat’l Bank of Portland v. 
Snodgrass, 275 P.2d 860, 872 (Or. 1954).  Because an individual earned his money, he 
should be able to transfer the money using any incentive condition he wishes to describe.  
Id. 
188 Snodgrass, 275 P.2d at 872.  However, a court may invalidate a will when an individual 
contests the will where the testator has disinherited the individual based on theories of a 
lack of mental capacity or undue influence.  Estate of Lewis, 770 A.2d 619, 621 (Me. 2001).  
For an explanation of the types of public policy flaws, see infra Parts III.B.3, IV (discussing 
the limitations that should be contained in a statute). 
189 Clark Hill PLC, supra note 58.  Lansky stated that reaction to trust restrictions can be 
strong resentment, or even hatred, when a beneficiary feels that the trust’s restrictions are 
unfair.  Id.  In addition, in some situations, the beneficiary may even “overvalue the action 
that was unfairly restricted.”  Id. 
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behavior the settlor considers wrong.190  For instance, when the condition 
in Brizendine only awarded the beneficiary if he had nothing to do with 
his wife, the purpose of the condition was to punish the beneficiary for 
staying married to a woman that the testatrix did not favor.191   
Although incentive conditions should be allowed because of the 
testator’s right to control his wealth, counterarguments do exist.192  The 
first concern is that incentive conditions may unreasonably hinder a 
beneficiary’s freedom of choice, as illustrated in Maddox, where the court 
failed to honor a provision that intruded on a beneficiary’s freedom to 
marry.193  A second counterargument is that incentive conditions that 
require a reasonableness interpretation  inevitably vary, inviting conflict 
and litigation.194  A third criticism of incentive conditions is that they can 
lead to a “carrot and stick” approach to transferring wealth, which can 
cause tension within families because the whole notion of incentive 
conditions implies distrust.195  The carrot and stick approach implies 
distrust because a beneficiary is portrayed as doing anything the testator 
conditioned in order to obtain the testator’s wealth, eliminating the 
beneficiary’s free choice.196  A fourth counterargument is that incentive 
conditions perpetuate dead-hand control, the ability to control others 
from the grave.197  Finally, the fifth concern is that testators will 
                                                 
190 Id. 
191 See supra notes 111–14 and accompanying text. 
192 See infra  notes 193–98 and accompanying text. 
193 See supra note 109 and accompanying text.  Further, an individual’s intentions will not 
be fulfilled when a court invalidates a condition that the individual has prescribed.  
Maddox v. Maddox, 52 Va. 804, 808 (1854). 
194 See supra text accompanying notes 80, 103. 
195 Langley & Gandara, supra note 51, at D1.  The carrot and stick approach compares 
incentive conditions to dangling a carrot in front of an animal to get the animal to do 
something.  Id.  Further, Hoge states that “[e]ven after the parents are dead, the child will 
feel like, ‘I’m still being put to the test.’”  Id.  Critics charge that such trusts bring a 
“carnival-like atmosphere to trust administration—hit the target, get a prize.”  Wells, 
Marble & Hurst PLLC, supra note 58.  Critics of family incentive trusts also claim that the 
increasing popularity of incentive conditions make it clear that knowing how to make 
millions implies nothing about knowing how to raise a family.  Katherine Hennessey 
Wikoff & Rachel Eisenman, The Trust-Fund Dole:  King Lear Syndrome?,  WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 
1999, at A15.  The critics point out that controlling purse strings are demonstrated in 
Shakespeare’s play, King Lear, where the strings attached to the inheritance strangles the 
giver and recipient.  Id.  In addition, in the play, the only daughter to love her father in the 
end is the one who refuses to let the conditions run her life.  Id.  The concept of family 
incentive conditions has the potential to become an obscene form of bribery that has 
significant flaws unless states codify some guidelines and restrictions on the ability to 
control from the grave through incentive conditions.  Id. 
196 See supra note 195 and accompanying text. 
197 Whiting, supra note 4, at 8.  Hobhouse wrote 125 years ago about the “cold and 
numbing influence of the Dead Hand”: 
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ambiguously describe the standards necessary to measure a condition or 
fail to adequately name an individual who is to evaluate the beneficiary’s 
conduct.198  Although these are legitimate concerns, they are not 
persuasive reasons to entirely invalidate incentive conditions because 
states can adopt statutes to address the criticisms, as discussed in the 
next Part.199 
B. Inadequacies of Current Case Law, Statutes, and Restatements  
Instead of allowing every incentive condition, states should 
legislatively permit incentive conditions but codify specific limitations to 
guard against abuse.200  By placing limits on the use of incentive 
conditions, states can allow a testator to distribute his wealth as desired 
but simultaneously prevent excessive limits on beneficiaries’ rights 
through dead-hand control.201  By creating a uniform statutory provision 
regarding incentive conditions, the fear of varying decisions by courts 
may also be addressed and resolved.202   
States have at least three general options available regarding how to 
handle incentive conditions in order to avoid tying up the courts with 
                                                                                                             
A clear, obvious, natural line is drawn for us between those persons 
and events which the Settlor  knows and sees, and those which he 
cannot know and see.  Within the former province we may push his 
natural affections and his capacity of judgment to made better 
dispositions than any external Law is likely to make for him.  Within 
the latter, natural affection does not extend, and the wisest judgment is 
constantly baffled by the course of events . . . people are the best judges 
of their own concerns; or if they are not, that it is better for them, on 
moral grounds, that they should manage their own concerns 
themselves, and that it cannot be wrong continually to claim this 
liberty for every Generation of mortal men. 
ARTHUR HOBHOUSE, THE DEAD HAND 183–85 (1880).  The general, time-honored rule, as 
illustrated in Snodgrass, that an individual is free to dispose of his property as he sees fit, 
with or without restrictions or conditions, also has flaws because of the testators’ ability to 
control others from the grave.  Whiting, supra note 4, at 11.  The law is less tolerant of dead-
hand control.  Id.  When an individual’s trust attempts to control another from the grave, 
even with the best of intentions, the beneficiary may retaliate against the strings that are 
attached to the wealth because of the beneficiary’s hatred and resentment.  Clark Hill PLC, 
supra note 58.  One of the objectives of the Rule Against Perpetuities is to put a finite limit 
on dead-hand control by limiting the number of years that a trust can control the choices 
and behaviors of other individuals.  See supra note 78. 
198 See infra notes 236–47. 
199 See supra Part III.B. 
200 See infra Part IV for a sample statute with specific limitations. 
201 See supra notes 78, 97; see also infra notes 226–35 and accompanying text. 
202 See infra text accompanying notes 228–30. 
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future litigation.203  This Part analyzes the three possible options for 
states.204  The first option is to adopt and codify the Restatement’s policy 
as set forth in section 29.205  The second option is to adopt only the first 
two requirements of the Restatement:  the requirement concerning the 
Rule Against Perpetuities and the requirement that an incentive 
condition not reward illegal activities.206  Finally, the third option is to 
develop codified restrictions relating to specific instances that invalidate 
an incentive condition, allowing conditions that do not fit any named 
restriction.207  
1. Codifying the Restatement 
The first option, adopting and codifying the Restatement, does not 
sufficiently address the problems related to incentive conditions because 
the courts would be left to determine which particular conditions satisfy 
the ambiguous statute.208  A state that adopts this option will encourage 
individuals to utilize incentive conditions and allow the state courts to 
determine which particular conditions satisfy the ambiguous statute.209  
The Restatement merely provides that particular incentive conditions 
may fail if the provision is against public policy, leaving the courts to 
determine exactly which provisions fail because of public policy.210  
Forcing the courts to determine the validity of specific conditions invites 
confusion and litigation, while, at the same time, families involved in 
condition disputes are divided over the distribution described in a 
condition.211  As illustrated in Lewis, a potential beneficiary may never 
know definitively whether he has satisfied the condition and may have 
to bring multiple lawsuits to determine the condition’s validity.212   
                                                 
203 See infra text accompanying notes 204–07. 
204 See infra notes 208–47 and accompanying text. 
205 See infra notes 208–16 and accompanying text. 
206 See infra notes 217–23 and accompanying text. 
207 See infra notes 224–48 and accompanying text.  The Restatement provides that an 
incentive condition is invalid if it calls for the beneficiary to commit a criminal or tortious 
act, if it violates the applicable Rule Against Perpetuities, or if it is against public policy.  
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 (2003). 
208 See supra Part II.D. 
209 See supra Part II.D. 
210 See supra Part II.D. 
211 See supra Part II.D. 
212 See supra notes 89–95 and accompanying text.  In Estate of Lewis, the court determined 
that a beneficiary’s challenge of an anti-harassment clause was void at that time because 
the issue was not ripe at the time of the decision.  770 A.2d 619, 624 (Me. 2001). 
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Therefore, the current form of the Restatement has unfortunate 
consequences.213  Fearing that a court may invalidate a certain condition, 
the individual may feel compelled to conservatively alter a desired 
condition or choose to not include the condition at all, which will 
prevent him from distributing his wealth as he desires.214  However, 
individuals should have the right to decide how to distribute their 
wealth by using incentive conditions, just as individuals have the right to 
distribute their wealth by disinheriting others during their lifetime.215  
Thus, adopting and codifying the Restatement may hurt a testator more 
than it helps him.216 
2. Codifying the First Two Restatement Clauses 
Because the Restatement’s current form regarding public policy 
creates ambiguity, a second option for states is to adopt a statute that 
only requires an incentive condition to comply with the Rule Against 
Perpetuities or not require illegal activity.217  However, this option also 
does not sufficiently address the full issues of incentive conditions.218  By 
adopting this option, a state’s legislation conveys that it values an 
individual’s freedom to make conditions and encourages an individual 
to include incentive conditions in his will or trust.219  A state may choose 
this option because an individual’s wealth is his own, and he should 
have the freedom to transfer his wealth in the way that he sees fit.220  In 
addition, conditions do not impose a loss on an heir because the money 
never belonged to the heir in the first place.221   
While allowing virtually any incentive condition gives individuals 
freedom to transfer their wealth in any manner they choose, regardless 
of public policy, the financial incentives for potential beneficiaries may 
                                                 
213 See supra notes 102–04 and accompanying text for an illustration of a condition that a 
court voided. 
214 See supra notes 102–04 and accompanying text. 
215 See supra notes 102–04 and accompanying text. 
216 See supra notes 208–15 and accompanying text. 
217 See supra note 73 and accompanying text.  For example, this statute will read: 
Section 2:  Validity of Incentive Conditions 
An incentive condition contained in a trust or will is invalid if it (a) 
violates rules relating to perpetuities or (b) contains a purpose that is 
unlawful or its performance calls for the commission of a criminal or 
tortious act. 
218 See infra notes 220–23 and accompanying text. 
219 See infra notes 220–23 and accompanying text. 
220 See supra notes 115–18, 187 and accompanying text. 
221 See supra text accompanying note 134; supra notes 132–35 and accompanying text. 
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unreasonably control the beneficiary’s life.222  Although the Rule Against 
Perpetuities addresses the issue of dead-hand control by limiting the 
period of time in which a testator can control another to twenty-one 
years, the restriction alone is inadequate because the Rule Against 
Perpetuities does not reach the control a testator can have over a 
beneficiary when the period is less than the twenty-one years.223   
3. Codifying Certain Limitations Involving Public Policy 
In contrast to the first two options, the third option, allowing 
incentive conditions but codifying limitations to the allowance of such 
conditions, does sufficiently address incentive condition issues because it 
permits the conditions but provides boundaries for testators to work 
within.224  In order to effectively describe requirements concerning 
incentive conditions, a state must address a wide range of public policy 
issues that may lead to confusion and conflict, such as the freedoms to 
associate, marry, and practice a religion.225 
The counterarguments of incentive conditions as applied to this 
third option should be addressed.  The argument that an incentive 
condition hinders a beneficiary’s freedom of choice fails because 
beneficiaries do not have rights to the money.226  Further, the law 
demonstrates that if the testators have some public policy limits placed 
upon them, then the issue of beneficiary’s rights will be non-existent.227   
Addressing the second concern, a purpose of the uniform state 
statute is to remedy varying decisions by the courts.228  Delineating 
which incentive conditions are invalid will provide more detailed 
guidelines for determining public policy violations in order to avoid 
future litigation.229  With a clear and exclusive list of invalidating 
conditions, individuals who desire to transfer their wealth may create 
incentive conditions and know that the conditions will be valid by 
running the conditions through the guidelines of the statute.230   
                                                 
222 See supra notes 102–04 and accompanying text (describing a case where one woman’s 
inheritance was conditioned on her marrying one of six men). 
223 See supra note 51. 
224 See infra text accompanying notes 225–48. 
225 See supra note 187. 
226 See supra notes 192–93 and accompanying text. 
227 See supra notes 110–14 and accompanying text. 
228 See supra note 194 and accompanying text. 
229 See supra Part II.E.4. 
230 See supra Part II.E.4. 
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With respect to the carrot and stick concern, potential beneficiaries 
will profit because the statute will ensure that the beneficiaries’ free will 
is not stripped from them and the conditions will be more reasonable.231  
By setting out the invalid incentive conditions, beneficiaries and testators 
will know ahead of time what is and is not appropriate.232   
The fourth counterargument, dead-hand control, while not 
necessarily always advantageous, can be beneficial in promoting 
productivity or values, and thus limitations will keep the condition from 
violating any public criticism of dead-hand control.233  Further, as 
circumstances and social policy changes, legislation can alter the list of 
limitations to ensure reasonableness through ratifications and 
amendments.234  Having the ability to amend the statute, a state’s 
legislation will provide families definite rules regarding the validity of a 
condition, which will in turn minimize conflicts within families and 
reduce litigation in the courts.235   
Finally, addressing the fifth concern regarding ambiguity within the 
condition, a state’s statute should describe the necessary language the 
condition must contain as well as the standards by which to measure the 
beneficiary’s behavior.236  Not only must the settlor possess the intent to 
have a trust, but the settlor must also express his intent effectively in 
writing or by communicating it to another.237  Although using formal or 
                                                 
231 See supra text accompanying notes 195–96. 
232 See supra text accompanying notes 195–96. 
233 See supra note 197 and accompanying text. 
234 See supra note 197 and accompanying text. 
235 See supra Part II.E.4. 
236 See supra text accompanying note 198. 
237 GEORGE T. BOGERT, TRUSTS § 11 (2d ed. 1987 & Supp. 2004).  Bogert refers to language 
in Semple v. Semple, 105 So. 134, 136 (Fla. 1925), which states: 
The grantor’s intention, with which he executes a deed of conveyance 
to another, which intention he does not reveal at the time of the 
conveyance and of which the grantee knows nothing, and the 
circumstances of the transaction are not of such character that an 
intention of the parties to create a trust may be presumed, does not 
create a trust upon the land conveyed.  In both an express and 
resulting trust the element of intention to create a trust must exist 
between the parties.  In one case the intention is expressed, in the other 
it is implied.  A constructive trust arises entirely by the operation of 
law without reference to any actual or supposed intention of creating a 
trust and often directly contrary to such intention.  They are entirely in 
invitum and are forced upon the conscience of the trustee for the 
purpose of working out right and justice or frustrating fraud. 
Id.  “A trust is created only if the settlor properly manifests an intention to create a trust 
relationship.”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 13, Intention to Create Trust (2003). 
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technical language is not a prerequisite to determine the validity of a 
trust, the settlor must clearly describe his desired provisions and 
standards.238  In his will, a testator must also name the person who shall 
determine whether the beneficiary has met the behavior set forth in the 
provisions.239  The only public policy requirement is that the trustee is to 
have the functions and duties that are incidental to trusteeship.240  For 
instance, the Laning court reconciled its decision with the Drace court’s 
decision by explaining the difference between the language and 
standards of the provisions, where a “remain[] faithful” condition was 
invalid because of vagueness, while a condition requiring beneficiaries to 
remain “members in good standing of the Presbyterian Church” was 
valid.241  
Furthermore, to create a trust, a settlor must show his intent with 
certainty and provide the terms of the trust.242  For example, the Jones 
court found that the testator did not provide for a trustee with 
discretionary power to decide whether the conditions had been met.243  
In addition, the trust in Jones provided no rule or test to evaluate the 
                                                 
238 BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 34, § 1 (referring to Teal v. Pleasant Grove Local Union 
No. 204, 75 So. 335 (Ala. 1917)).  Specifically, George G. Bogert and George T. Bogert’s 
hornbook on trusts states: 
In order to create an express trust the settlor’s intent must be expressed 
and not merely formed in his own mind.  Although it may be 
expressed (subject to formality requirements later stated) by conduct of 
the settlor, the use of written or spoken words is the method almost 
universally employed.  The trust property and the beneficiaries must 
be described with certainty.  No particular words or phrases need be 
used, and words of trusteeship are not necessarily conclusive. 
BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 34, § 11. 
239 BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 34, § 11. 
240 Id. § 1, at 466.  In some cases, the courts have found that an expression made by the 
settlor contained the intent to create a trust even though the settlor did not set up a trust 
himself.  Id.  Also, consider In re Butler’s Will, where an intent to have a trust was shown 
when the settlor expressed his intent that the gift for the beneficiary should be managed by  
another person because of the beneficiary’s inability to manage the gift herself.  151 
N.Y.S.2d 866 (N.Y. App. Div. 1956). 
241 See supra notes 136–39 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 117, 150 (discussing 
the effects of a vague condition).  Further, the Cassem v. Kennedy court stated:  “Had the 
conditions stopped with the words ‘till he settles down in life,’ it might have been said the 
event was not capable of definite ascertainment,—that is to say, there might be a difference 
of opinion as to whether a man had ‘settled down in life.’”  35 N.E. 738, 739 (Ill. 1893); see 
supra notes 140–43. 
242 BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 34, § 1. 
243 Jones v. Jones, 123 S.W. 29, 38 (Mo. 1909); see supra notes 153–57 and accompanying 
text. 
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heir’s conduct as it related to the condition.244  Courts that invalidate a 
condition because the testator failed to describe a specific standard of 
conduct have ruled correctly because if a beneficiary is to meet a certain 
condition, a testator must specifically describe the standard that 
measures the beneficiary’s conduct.245  Standards for meeting an 
incentive condition are essential because a beneficiary will know exactly 
what he has to do to receive the wealth that the testator is willing to 
transfer to him.246  Furthermore, when a testator clearly knows the state’s 
standards by which the state evaluates the testator’s conditions, the 
testator will be certain that the condition he drafted will be valid.247 
Thus, in order to allow an individual freedom to transfer his wealth 
as he sees fit, while ensuring potential beneficiaries reasonable 
conditions, a state should adopt a statute that provides a list involving 
specific instances that will invalidate an incentive condition.248  Part IV 
provides an example of a state statute that addresses specific incentive 
conditions with codified limitations.249 
IV.  CONTRIBUTION 
States may face increased litigation if they fail to adopt a statute that 
sufficiently addresses incentive conditions.250  States have several options 
in adopting a statute to deal with the validity of incentive conditions.251  
Some of the options for a statute regulating incentive conditions include:  
(1) a statute that is similar to the Restatement, which allows an incentive 
condition that does not require illegal activity, does not violate the Rule 
Against Perpetuities, and does not violate public policy; (2) a statute, 
where the only restrictions are the Rule Against Perpetuities and a 
condition that calls for an unlawful, criminal, or tortious act; or (3) a 
statute that contains specific incentive conditions that are invalid, 
                                                 
244 Jones, 123 S.W. at 38.  Further, some courts have found that the conditions were 
sufficiently certain while others have found enough vagueness and indefiniteness in 
similar conditions to render the trusts void.  BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 34, § 1. 
245 See supra notes 158–60 and accompanying text. 
246 See supra notes 158–60 and accompanying text. 
247 See supra text accompanying note 168. 
248 See infra Part IV for a statute and the description of the statute that provides specific 
limitations regarding incentive conditions. 
249 See infra Part IV. 
250 See supra Part III. 
251 See supra Part III. 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 40, No. 3 [2006], Art. 11
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol40/iss3/11
2006] Validity of Innovative Financial Parenting 937 
including the particular topics that violate public policy and lack the 
requisite descriptive language of the condition.252   
First, this Note proposes that states should allow incentive 
conditions.253  Further, states should adopt statutes that take the 
uncertainty out of public policy.  Finally, this Note proposes that states 
not only address incentive conditions by statute, but that states adopt 
statutes that contain specific incentive conditions that are invalid in 
addition to ones that simply violate public policy.  Thus, this Part 
provides a sample statute with corresponding commentary that allows 
incentive conditions while codifying specific limitations. 
A Proposed Statute Involving Incentive Conditions 
Section 1:  Incentive Conditions Presumed Valid 
An incentive condition in a will or trust is presumed valid 
and is invalid only if described in Section 2 or Section 3. 
Section 2:  Validity of Incentive Conditions  
An incentive condition contained in a trust or will is invalid if 
it:  (a) violates rules relating to perpetuities;  (b) contains a  
purpose that is unlawful or its performance calls for the 
commission of a criminal or tortious act;  (c) is intended only 
to threaten a beneficiary with no intention of legally enforcing 
the condition; (d) restricts a beneficiary’s right to marry any 
individual unless the money is clearly for support until a 
beneficiary marries; (e) restricts a beneficiary’s right to 
associate with particular individuals; or (f) restricts the right 
of an individual to practice a particular religion. 
Section 3:  Language and Standards of an Incentive Condition 
An incentive condition is invalid when:  (a) the terms of the 
condition are ambiguous or unclear; (b) the condition cannot 
be reasonably measured; or (c) the individual determining 
whether a condition is met has a personal interest in the 
evaluation.254 
                                                 
252 See supra Part III. 
253 See supra Part III. 
254 The proposed statute is italicized and is the contribution of the author. 
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Commentary 
A statute that clearly states limitations to incentive conditions will 
provide guidelines for conditions that violate public policy, which will 
avoid future litigation.255  States that choose to adopt an expansion of the 
Restatement should provide further guidelines as to the validity of an 
incentive condition in order to avoid future litigation.256  With more 
guidelines, individuals who desire to transfer their wealth may create 
incentive conditions and know the conditions will be valid by running 
the conditions through the guidelines of the statute.257  Potential 
beneficiaries will appreciate such a  statute because it will ensure that the 
beneficiaries’ free will is not stripped from them and the conditions will 
be more reasonable.258 
The first section of the statute simply states the presumption that any 
incentive condition is valid if it does not fall into any of the following 
sections of the statute.  Thus, to easily determine if a given condition is 
valid, an individual must ensure that the condition does not have traits 
described in the next two sections. 
The second section lists specific ways that an incentive condition 
could fail.  As mentioned in the Restatement, the first two subsections 
address the Rule Against Perpetuities and any condition that calls for a 
criminal or tortiuous act.259  Subsection (c) concerns in terrorem 
provisions.  In terrorem provisions are merely empty threats, as 
discussed earlier, and it is beneficial to prohibit such conditions to 
promote efficiency in the courts and tranquility among families.260  
Subsections (d) and (e) address the general right for a beneficiary to 
marry and associate.  However, within the subsection, one exception 
exists for conditions that put a restraint on marriage when its purpose is 
clearly for support of the beneficiary.  Finally, subsection (f) states that 
no individual can restrain another’s religious choice.  An individual can 
encourage a particular religion but cannot condition a transfer upon 
another not choosing a particular religion.261 
                                                 
255 See supra Part III.C. 
256 See supra Part III.C. 
257 See supra Part III.C. 
258 See supra Part III.C. 
259 See supra note 73 for the specific language of the Restatement. 
260 See supra Part II.E.1. 
261 For example, a condition is valid when it reads:  “To A if A is a member of the 
Catholic church,” because the condition merely encourages a religion.  However, a 
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Section three of the proposed statute describes the language required 
to render an incentive condition valid.  Each subsection is present in 
order to promote efficiency.  Subsection (a) requires clear terms, forcing 
drafters to consider potential ramifications of various interpretations of a 
condition in order to ensure the validity of the condition.  Further, unless 
the terms are reasonably measurable, no reason exists to contain the 
condition because immeasurable conditions invite conflicts and 
confusion.  Finally, to avoid the problem of having trustees with 
conflicting interests regarding the evaluation of the condition, subsection 
(c) states that a trustee must not have the potential to gain financially 
depending on his evaluation of the condition.  Thus, the proposed 
statute adequately incorporates the freedom to include incentive 
conditions in a will or trust while providing specific public policy 
guidelines that allow beneficiaries the freedom to make life choices as 
well. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In sum, individuals will transfer a magnitude of wealth in the 
upcoming years.  Individuals are increasingly attaching conditions in 
their wills and trusts that a beneficiary must meet in order to receive any 
or all of the assets.  The conditions reflect the desires of the testator, 
including family and religious desires as well as work productivity 
standards.  The number of individuals attaching conditions that depend 
on behavior is growing, just as the creativity of the conditions is 
expanding.  The conditions may encourage or completely control the 
actions of the beneficiary, and receiving money may depend on the 
behavior or beliefs of the beneficiaries. 
While individuals are relying on incentive conditions, many states 
do not address the validity of incentive conditions in their statutes.  
Further, case treatment of incentive conditions is limited while the 
amount of creativity used in making the conditions is growing.  The 
validity of an incentive condition is often subject to interpretation, which 
leads to litigation.  Individuals wishing to attach incentive conditions to 
their wealth deserve to know their state’s guidelines and limits 
regarding the validity of an incentive condition so that their wishes for 
their wealth distributions are met. 
                                                                                                             
condition is invalid when it reads, “To A, but not if A is a member of the Catholic church,” 
because the condition restricts A’s right to practice a particular religion. 
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States should provide its citizens with an exclusive list of the types of 
conditions that invalidate an incentive condition.  Such a statute will 
provide the assurance that a condition is valid, grant potential 
beneficiaries freedom to prohibit anyone from controlling them for 
reasons that are destructive, and decrease unnecessary and inefficient 
litigation.  
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